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The Case of Lautsi v. Italy: A Synthesis 
Grégor Puppinck* 
The case of Lautsi v. Italy, better known as the “Crucifix Case,” is a 
particularly significant case. Its significance is not only political and 
legal, but also religious. Never before in the history of the European 
Court of Human Rights and the Council of Europe has a case raised so 
much public attention and debate. The debate regarding the legitimacy of 
the symbol of Christ’s presence in Italian schools is emblematic of the 
cultural crisis in Western Europe regarding religion. Twenty-one State 
parties to the European Convention on Human Rights, in an 
unprecedented move, joined Italy to reassert the legitimacy of the public 
display of Christian symbols in European society. The Court finally 
recognized, in substance, that in countries of Christian tradition, 
Christianity enjoys a special social legitimacy that distinguishes it from 
other philosophical and religious belief systems. In other words, because 
Italy is a country of Christian tradition, Christian symbols may 
legitimately enjoy greater visibility in Italian society than other religious 
or ideological symbols. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On March 18, 2011, the European Court of Human Rights, sitting as 
a Grand Chamber (“GC”), pronounced its judgment in the case of Soile 
Lautsi and Others v. Italy.1 
By this final judgment, which overturned a unanimous judgment 
rendered on November 3, 2009, by the Second Section2 of the Strasbourg 
Court, the Grand Chamber3 decided, by fifteen votes to two, that the 
compulsory display of crucifixes in Italian State-school classrooms did 
not violate Article 2 of the first Protocol of the European Convention on 
Human Rights.4 Article 2 of the first Protocol protects the right of 
parents to ensure that the education and teaching of their children is “in 
conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions.”5 
Moreover, the Court decided that, for the reasons given in connection 
with its examination of the rights of parents, there was no violation of 
Article 9,6 which protects the freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion.7 Nor did the Court find a violation of Article 14,8 which 
prohibits  
 
discrimination in the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in 
 
 1. Lautsi v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. (G.C.). 
 2. A Section is an administrative entity, and a Chamber is a judicial formation of the Court 
within a given Section. The Court has five Sections in which Chambers are formed. Each Section 
has a President, a Vice-President, and a number of other judges. 
 3. The Grand Chamber is made up of 17 judges: the Court’s President and Vice-Presidents, 
the Section Presidents, and the national judge, together with other judges selected by drawing of lots. 
The initiation of proceedings before the Grand Chamber takes two different forms: referral and 
relinquishment. After a Chamber judgment has been delivered, the parties may request referral of the 
case to the Grand Chamber and such requests are accepted on an exceptional basis. A panel of 
judges of the Grand Chamber decides whether or not the case should be referred to the Grand 
Chamber for fresh consideration. Cases are also sent to the Grand Chamber when relinquished by a 
Chamber, although this is also exceptional. The Chamber to which a case is assigned can relinquish 
it to the Grand Chamber if the case raises a serious question affecting the interpretation of the 
Convention or if there is a risk of inconsistency with a previous judgment of the Court. See The 
Court, EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, (Aug. 4, 2012, 3:18 PM), 
http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/The+Court/The+Court/The+Grand+Chamber/. 
 4. Lautsi, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. §§ 77–78. 
 5. Protocol No. 1 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, art. 2, 4 Nov. 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221[hereinafter Protocol No. 1]. 
 6. Lautsi, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. §§ 77–78. 
 7. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 9, 4 
Nov. 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. [hereinafter Convention]. 
 8. Lautsi, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 81. 
PUPPINCK.MRO2 2/8/2013 2:41 PM 




Therefore, the Grand Chamber held that the rights invoked by Mrs. 
Soile Lautsi and her children, guaranteed by the Convention and the 
Court’s interpretations, were not violated by the display of a crucifix in 
State-school classrooms.10 
The motivation behind this case was prompted by what is known in 
English-speaking countries as “strategic litigation.” The aim of the 
Italian free-thought organizations acting under the guise of Mrs. Lautsi 
was to use the European Court to reach a political result that had an 
impact broad enough to exceed the original legal scope of the 
application. This strategic litigation was the source of the great confusion 
surrounding this case. By creating a new obligation of religious 
neutrality within State-school education, the Second Section forsook 
legal rigor and judicial reserve. It raised uncertainty about the nature and 
limits of the Court’s competence and deepened its crisis.11 Moreover, the 
Second Section focused on the political theme of secularism instead of 
analyzing the provisions of the Convention. In doing so, the Second 
Section caused a meta-political crisis concerning the place of Christianity 
in Europe and the political legitimacy of the European Court. This crisis 
will have long-term consequences, as it has seriously impaired the 
prestige and authority of the Court. 
The initial legal question concerning the potential negative impact of 
the crucifix on the freedom of students and their parents fell to the 
background. Persuading the Court to refocus on the primary legal issue 
required great effort. Eventually, the Grand Chamber did address the 
pertinent issue, simply ruling, as previously suggested, that the presence 
of a crucifix does not result in the indoctrination of students.12 
On review, the Grand Chamber also had to correct some faulty 
assertions made by the Second Section decision. It did so, first, by 
dealing with a jurisdictional issue in which it recalled that the European 
Court is not a constitutional court but can intervene only subsidiarily and 
must respect the “margin of appreciation”13 of States.14 On political 
 
 9. Convention, supra note 7, at art. 14. 
 10. Lautsi, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 32. 
 11. The ECHR is facing a structural crisis that is at the origin of its current process of reform. 
 12. Lautsi, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 71. 
 13. The legal concept of “margin of appreciation” refers to the variable space for maneuver 
that the Court is willing to recognize to national authorities in fulfilling their obligations under the 
European Convention on Human Rights on a case-by-case basis. 
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grounds, it also had to correct the Second Section’s assertions concerning 
the purpose of State-school education and religious neutrality.15 
As to the merits, contrary to the Second Section decision, the Grand 
Chamber clearly affirmed that the Convention does not require the 
complete religious neutrality of State-school education.16 Furthermore, 
the Convention does not hinder the State’s liberty to “confer on the 
country’s majority religion preponderant visibility in the school 
environment.”17 This is justified “in view of the place occupied by 
Christianity in the history and tradition of the respondent State,” and it 
does not in itself “denote a process of indoctrination on the respondent 
State’s part” in violation of the provisions of Article 2 of Protocol 1.18 In 
addition, the Grand Chamber did not question the State’s legitimate 
authority to respect religious differences or treat religions differently 
according to their contribution to the national culture.19 
The main principle distilled from Lautsi may be clearly expressed by 
stating that the Court expects States to act neutrally toward citizens, but 
it does not require States to be neutral (in essence). National culture and 
identities do not have to be “neutralized,” neutrality being an essentially 
relative concept.20 Moreover, States are not required to act neutrally at 
all times and in all matters. Neutrality is demanded only when the State 
infringes personal religious rights.21 If there is no infringement of 
individual religious rights in the sense of the Convention, the State is not 
bound to act neutrally. 
The State’s obligations regarding religious neutrality are relative; 
neutrality is not a general and absolute obligation. 
In addition, the manifestation by the State of a preference towards a 
specific religion does not necessarily breach a citizen’s individual 
religious rights. In Lautsi, it was not proved that the display of a crucifix 
in a public classroom indoctrinated or severely disturbed pupils, so it was 
determined that there was no infringement of the applicants’ individual 
religious rights.22 Therefore, there was no legal necessity to examine 
 
 14. Id. §§ 61, 69–70. 
 15. Id. § 62. 
 16. Id. §§ 71–72. 
 17. Id. § 71 
 18. Id. 
 19. See id. 
 20. See id. § 67–68. 
 21. See id. § 7. 
 22. See id. 
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whether the State failed to respect its duty of neutrality, since it was not 
bound by any such duty. 
It cannot be contested that the display of a crucifix—whether in a 
State-school or in any other public place—is not neutral in itself. On the 
contrary, it is the expression of “a preference manifested by the State in 
religious matters.”23 However, because this specific preference and the 
way it is manifested are not sufficient to infringe the religious rights of 
those exposed to it, as it does not involve coercion by the State to 
practice or support a particular religion, it does not constitute a violation 
of the Convention. It would be different if this preference was manifested 
through a civic obligation imposed on all to actively participate in 
catechism classes or worship within a specific religion. 
This Article presents a summary of the key lessons of the Lautsi 
case, from the institutional, legal, philosophical, political, and religious 
viewpoints. 
This Article analyzes the reasoning of the court confronted with 
Lautsi, but specifically the reasoning set forth by the Second Section and 
the Grand Chamber. Part II provides a review of the factual and 
procedural history of Lautsi in the Italian courts, as well as a brief 
overview of the relevant legal issues later dealt with in the European 
courts. Part III reviews the Second Section’s reasoning of Lautsi. Part IV 
reviews the Grand Chamber’s reasoning in Lautsi, as well as analysis 
explaining why the decision was correct and explains why the Second 
Section’s reasoning was problematic. Part V provides some 
supplementary comments on the Grand Chamber judgment, including a 
discussion of the consequences of Lautsi. 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF LAUTSI 
At the root of the Lautsi case was the refusal by a school’s governing 
body to grant the request of a parent to remove a crucifix that was 
displayed in her sons’ classrooms.24 To support their request to the 
school governors to remove the displays, the applicants relied on a recent 
decision by the Italian Court of Cassation,25 which held that the display 
of a crucifix in a polling station infringed the principles of secularism 
and impartiality of the State, as well as the principle of freedom of 
 
 23. Id. § 48. 
 24. Id. §§ 10–12. 
 25. Id. at 11. 
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conscience for those who did not accept any allegiance to that symbol.26 
The principle of secularism, which is relatively new in Italy, was defined 
and enshrined as a constitutional principle by a judgment of the 
Constitutional Court in 1989,27 just five years after the adoption of the 
new Concordat, which put an end to the system of State religion.28 In 
this judgment, the Constitutional Court stated that in Italy, secularism 
does not mean “that the State should be indifferent to religions but that it 
should guarantee the protection of the freedom of religion in a context of 
confessional and cultural pluralism.”29 Thus, the constitutional principle 
of secularism in Italy is meant to secure “an open and inclusive attitude, 
closer to equidistance, which respects the distinction and autonomy of 
spiritual and temporal areas, without privatizing religion or excluding it 
from the public area.”30 
The crucifix was displayed according to an age-old tradition in Italy 
of displaying crucifixes in classrooms. Presently, there is a civil 
obligation to display a crucifix in each public classroom that allegedly 
dates back to royal decree No. 4336 of September 15, 1860, of the 
Kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia, which provided that “each school must 
without fail be equipped . . . with a crucifix.”31 This obligation has been 
maintained under subsequent regimes until the present day. Confirmed 
by a series of regulations in the 1920s, it was not abolished by the 1984 
revision of the Lateran Pacts, which put an end to the State religion.32 
Furthermore, the practice of displaying  
 
 
crucifixes in the classroom was again expressly confirmed on October 3, 
2002, in an instruction by the Minister of Education.33 
According to the applicants, the provisions requiring the presence of 
a crucifix in the classroom “are the legacy of a confessional conception 
of the State which now contradicts the duty of the State to be secular, as 
well as the respect of human rights as guaranteed by the Convention.”34 
 
 26. Lautsi v. Italy, App. 30814/06, 2009 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 7 (2d Sec.). 
 27. Corte Cost., 12 April 1989, n. 203. 
 28. Lautsi, 2009 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 23.  
 29. Id.  
 30. Presentation of the Italian Government before the Grand Chamber (G.C.), 30 June 2010; 
Lautsi, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 7.  
 31. Lautsi, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 17.  
 32. Id. §§ 19–20, 22–23.  
 33. Id. § 24. 
 34. Observations of the applicants in reply to the complementary observations, Section, 16 
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In their view, it is necessary to put an end to the “contradictions and 
inconsistencies” of the constitutional provisions regarding religion that 
were “the result of a compromise between concurring political forces 
within the Constituent Assembly . . . grant[ing]35 the Catholic Church a 
privileged position in contradiction with the principle of the secularity of 
the State.”36 Therefore, the applicants contested the displays of the 
crucifix in the national administrative courts because they considered 
them to be an infringement of the principle of secularism. 
The Veneto Administrative Court as well as the Supreme 
Administrative Court refused to follow the decision of the Court of 
Cassation regarding polling stations and held that the presence of a 
crucifix in a public classroom was compatible with the principle of 
secularism.37 After a lengthy analysis of modern Europe’s Christian 
heritage, the Supreme Administrative Court rejected the application, 
concluding that the crucifix is a symbol that expresses a synthesis of the 
history, culture, and values of Italy and Europe as a whole.38 Thus, the 
crucifix is the objective representation of a series of values, despite its 
religious origin. Therefore, these courts held that there is a fundamental 
compatibility between the crucifix and the principle of secularism 
because of the historical “filiation” between the two, which is not 
necessarily true for symbols of other religions or belief systems. 
 
Specifically, the Supreme Administrative Court39 reasoned that: 
The reference, via the crucifix, to the religious origin of these values 
and their full and complete correspondence with Christian teachings 
accordingly makes plain the transcendent sources of the values 
concerned, without calling into question, rather indeed confirming the 
autonomy of the temporal power vis-à-vis the spiritual power (but not 
their opposition, implicit in an ideological interpretation of secularism 
which has no equivalent in the Constitution), and without taking 
anything away from their particular “secular” nature, adapted to the 
cultural context specific to the fundamental order of the Italian State 
and manifested by it. Those values are therefore experienced in civil 
society autonomously (and not contradictorily) in relation to religious 
 
March 2009, p. 2. 
 35. Through the reference to the Catholic Church and the Lateran Pacts in the Constitution.  
 36. Observations of the applicants in reply to the complementary observations, Section, 16 
March 2009, pp. 4, 5. 
 37. Lautsi, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. §§ 15–16. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Cons. Stato, 13 April 2006, n. 556. 
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society, so that they may be endorsed “secularly” by all, irrespective of 
adhesion to the creed which inspired and defended them.40 
The Supreme Administrative Court therefore adopted a position 
opposite to that of the Court of Cassation,41 which in its 2000 decision 
expressly rejected the argument that the crucifix should be seen as the 
symbol of “an entire civilisation or the collective ethical conscience” and 
“a universal value independent of any specific religious creed.”42 
Consequently, these two courts differed significantly in their 
interpretation of the meaning and compatibility of the crucifix with 
secularism. 
On review, the Constitutional Court did not have the opportunity to 
settle the Lautsi dispute. Although the administrative court incidentally 
referred the case to the Constitutional Court, it ruled that it did not have 
jurisdiction over the case because the legal authorities requiring the 
presence of a crucifix in the classroom were only regulations.43 Amidst 
the conflict of these various courts, the case was then submitted to the 
European Court of Human Rights (“European Court”). 
Thus, after having contested what they considered to be a violation 
of the principle of secularism before national courts in vain, the two 
children and their mother, Mrs. Soile Lautsi, applied to the European 
Court on July 27, 2006.44 Before the European Court, they claimed that 
their rights to education, guaranteed by Article 2 of the first Protocol,45 
as well as their rights to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, 
protected by Article 9 of the Convention,46 had been violated.47 Because 
 
 40. Id. § 16.  
 41. The Supreme Administrative Court ruled in favor of the compatibility of the crucifix with 
secularism in Cons. Stato, 27 April 1988, n. 63. 
 42. Lautsi, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. at § 23. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. § 1. 
 45. Protocol No. 1, supra note 5, art. 2. Article 2 of Protocol 1 makes the following 
guarantees: “No person shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise of any functions which 
it assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall respect the right of parents to 
ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical 
convictions.” Id. 
 46. Convention, supra note 7, art. 9. Article 9 of the Convention provides the following 
guarantees: 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right 
includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in 
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in 
worship, teaching, practice and observance. 
2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations 
as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
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they were not Catholic, the applicants also asserted that they were treated 
in a discriminatory manner in comparison with Catholic parents and 
children,48 contrary to Article 14 of the Convention, which prohibits 
discrimination based on religion.49 
Beyond the specific provisions they invoked, the applicants, 
supported by Italian free-thought organizations,50 wanted the European 
Court to rule in favor of secularism, as it had in the cases relating to the 
prohibition of Islamic headscarves in the education system.51 Their aim 
was to have the Court rule that “religious neutrality” was required under 
the right to freedom of religion for non-believers; more precisely, the 
applicants sought a ruling in favor of an extensive negative freedom52 of 
religion for non-believers.53 This was particularly significant to the 
applicants because the Court long ago stated that “freedom of thought, 
conscience, and religion . . . is also a precious asset for atheists, 
agnostics, sceptics, and the unconcerned. The pluralism of democratic 
society, which has been dearly won over the centuries, depends on it.”54 
III. THE REASONING OF THE SECOND SECTION 
A. Redefining the Aim of the State-School System 
The Second Section began its reasoning by discussing what it 
thought freedom of education should entail. From there, it proceeded to a 
novel interpretation of the second sentence of Article 2 of Protocol 1, 
which altered its meaning. This sentence reads: “In the exercise of any 
functions which it assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the 
State shall respect the right of parents to ensure such education and 
teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical 
 
public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of 
the rights and freedoms of others. 
 47. Lautsi, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 41. 
 48. Id. § 79. 
 49. Convention, supra note 7, art. 14. According to Article 14, “The enjoyment of the rights 
and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as 
sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with 
a national minority, property, birth or other status.” Id. 
 50. See, e.g., Lautsi, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. §§ 50–51, 53–54.  
 51. Id. § 53. 
 52. I.e. a right to “non-religion,” a right not to practice, a right not to be confronted with 
religion, etc. 
 53. See Lautsi, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 54. 
 54. Buscarini v. San Marino, App. 24645/94, 1999 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 34; see also Spaminato v. 
Italy, App. 23123/04, 2007 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
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convictions.”55 The Second Section interpreted this sentence to mean 
that the responsibility of “safeguarding the possibility of pluralism in 
education, which possibility is essential for the preservation of the 
‘democratic society’ as conceived by the Convention” is entrusted to the 
State rather than the private education system.56 In other words, this 
article, which was originally meant to protect the natural educative rights 
of parents (especially through private education) against public sway 
(through compulsory public education), was interpreted by the Second 
Section as imposing on the State a duty to make the environment and 
content of State education “pluralistic” and consistent with “democratic 
values” as interpreted by the Court. This constituted a misinterpretation 
of the second sentence of Article 2 of Protocol 1, which merely stands 
for the principle that in a democracy, the educative offerings should be 
pluralistic, not the teaching itself. As a result, the Second Section’s 
approach to that text constituted more than a mere shift in interpretation. 
B. Educative Pluralism as an Aim 
In addition to misinterpreting the State’s role, the Second Section 
defined educative pluralism as “an open school environment which 
encourages inclusion rather than exclusion, regardless of the pupils’ 
social background, religious beliefs or ethnic origins.”57 The Second 
Section continued, stating that “[s]chools should not be the arena for 
missionary activities or preaching; they should be a meeting place for 
different religions and philosophical convictions, in which pupils can 
acquire knowledge about their respective thoughts and traditions.”58 
Teaching must be conveyed “in an objective, critical and pluralistic 
manner” and avoid any “aim of indoctrination that might be considered 
as not respecting parents’ religious and philosophical convictions,”59 
especially “the freedom not to believe.”60 Finally, the State “must seek to 
inculcate in pupils the habit of critical thought.”61 
Once the aim of the State education system had been set, the 
conclusion followed: the Court “cannot see how the display in state-
school classrooms of a symbol that it is reasonable to associate with 
 
 55. Protocol No. 1, supra note 5, at art. 2. 
 56. Lautsi, 2009 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 47(b). 
 57. Id. § 47(c). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. § 47(d). 
 60. Id. § 47(e). 
 61. Id. § 56. 
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Catholicism (the majority religion in Italy) could serve the educational 
pluralism which is essential for the preservation of ‘democratic society’ 
within the Convention meaning of that term.”62 The paradox of the 
notion of “educational pluralism” clearly appears here. The Court a 
contrario concluded that educative pluralism would be better respected 
without crucifixes. As a result, this “pluralism” ironically results in 
exclusion of the very possibility of plurality by imposing the monopoly 
of secularism. This apparent paradox reveals the profound cohesion 
between the concepts of relativism, pluralism and secularism. 
C. Summary of the Second Section’s Reasoning 
Once the new aim for the State education system has been defined, it 
becomes the legal basis for adopting new standards that are necessary for 
the implementation of those aims. The Second Section will build its 
reasoning on this telos of the State education system. Here is a summary 
of the Second Section’s reasoning: 
The Court’s argument rested on the principle of denominational 
neutrality, a corollary of the political principle of educative 
pluralism: “The State has a duty to uphold confessional neutrality in 
public education, where school attendance is compulsory regardless of 
religion, and which must seek to inculcate in pupils the habit of critical 
thought.”63 
Freedom of religion, as guaranteed by Article 9 of the Convention, 
implies a “negative freedom” not to believe.64 This negative freedom 
does not simply protect against co-action, for example, the obligation to 
participate in religious activities. Rather, it extends to practices and 
symbols expressing, in particular or in general, a belief, a religion, or 
atheism. That negative right deserves special protection if it is the State 
that expresses a belief and dissenters are placed in a situation from which 
they cannot extract themselves without making disproportionate efforts 
and acts of sacrifice.65 
The crucifix has a variety of meanings, among which the religious 
meaning predominates.66 It cannot be considered as having “a neutral 
and secular meaning with reference to Italian history and tradition, which 
 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. § 56. 
 64. Id. § 47(e). 
 65. Id. § 55. 
 66. Id. § 51. 
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were closely bound up with Christianity.”67 On the contrary, the crucifix 
is a “powerful external symbol,” in the same way as the Islamic 
headscarf worn by a teacher in a Swiss State school is a symbol.68 
“The presence of the crucifix may easily be interpreted by pupils of 
all ages as a religious sign, and they will feel that they have been brought 
up in a school environment marked by a particular religion.”69 The 
display of a symbol of the majority religion has greater impact because  
in countries where the great majority of the population owe allegiance 
to one particular religion the manifestation of the observances and 
symbols of that religion, without restriction as to place and manner, 
may constitute pressure on students who do not practise that religion or 
those who adhere to another religion.70 
The display of the crucifix may also be “emotionally disturbing” for non-
Christian pupils.71 
Displaying a crucifix “restricts the right of parents to educate their 
children in conformity with their convictions and the right of 
schoolchildren to believe or not believe.”72 
“The display of one or more religious symbols cannot be justified 
either by the wishes of other parents who want to see a religious form of 
education in conformity with their convictions or . . . by the need for a 
compromise with political parties of Christian inspiration.”73 Neither can 
it be justified by the fact that it expresses Italian history and tradition, 
because its religious meaning predominates.74 The fact that the crucifix 
symbolizes the Italian majority religion does not justify its presence; on 
the contrary, it is an aggravating circumstance.75 
Having stated this, the Court concluded that the applicants’ rights 
had been violated.76 Once the aim of State education had been 
established, its telos, the condemnation of Italy was certain. It was 
formulated by a reasoning which aimed almost teleologically at this 
 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. § 54 (citing Dahlab v. Switzerland, App. 42393/98, 2001 Eur. Ct. H.R.).  
 69. Id. § 55. 
 70. Id. § 50. 
 71. Id. § 55. 
 72. Id. § 57. 
 73. Id. § 56.  
 74. Id. §§ 51–52. 
 75. See id. § 50. This summary takes again, in part, the observations submitted to the Court 
by the Italian Government. 
 76. Id. § 58.  
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conclusion. This reasoning, unanimously adopted, seduces through its 
coherence and its general and abstract character. This line of reasoning 
looks like the following: educative pluralismreligious 
neutralitycondemnation of the crucifix. 
D. Responses to the Second Section Decision: A Disputed Judgment 
The Second Section’s reasoning not only affected Italy specifically, 
but also went much further in its influence. The general principles 
established by the Second Section in Lautsi impacted the State schools of 
the forty-seven Member States of the Council of Europe, many of which 
require or tolerate religious symbols in their own schools. For example, 
in Austria religious symbols are compulsory in primary and secondary 
schools in accordance with the concordat.77 This is also the case in 
Bavaria and other German Länder with a Catholic majority,78 as well as 
in Greece, Ireland, Liechtenstein, Malta, some State schools in the 
Netherlands, Poland, Romania, San-Marino, some Swiss cantons, and 
Alsace-Moselle.79 
Moreover, the reasoning of the Second Section was transposable and 
applicable beyond the present case and circumstances, especially to the 
courts, parliaments, and other public places of the States. Further, this 
reasoning was understood as potentially applicable to the symbols of 
States, such as national anthems, flags, or a constitutional provision 
recognizing a particular religion. 
Thus, this judgment constituted a decisive step in the secularization 
of Europe. Unusually, the Court was not able to garner widespread 
acceptance of this judgment. Some European States, on the initiative of 
Rome and then Moscow, created a type of “alliance against 
secularism”80 supporting the request of the Italian Government to refer 
the case to the Grand Chamber. At first, ten countries intervened in the 
Lautsi case as amici curiae.81 Each of them submitted written 
observations to the Grand Chamber, inviting it to quash the first 
 
 77. See Lautsi v. Italy, App. 30814/06, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 27 (G.C.). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Grégor Puppinck, Une Alliance Contre le Sécularisme, Osservatore Romano, Rome, 27 
July 2010. 
 81. Lautsi, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 8. These governments included Armenia, Bulgaria, Cyprus, 
Greece, Lithuania, Malta, Monaco, Romania, Russian Federation, and San-Marino. Id. These letters 
may be consulted in the file on the case at the Court’s Registry. 
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judgment.82 Moreover, eight of them were allowed to intervene 
collectively at the public hearing on June 30, 2010.83 These interventions 
are interesting not only from a legal point of view, but also because they 
constitute testimonies supporting the defense of European culture. 
In addition to these ten countries, eleven others publicly questioned 
the judgment of the Court and requested that their national and religious 
identities and traditions be respected.84 Several governments recalled 
that this religious identity was the source of European values and unity. 
Lithuania drew a parallel between the Lautsi case and the anti-religious 
policy it suffered under communism, which was manifested by, among 
other things, the prohibition of religious symbols. Thus, including Italy, 
nearly one half of the Member States of the Council of Europe (twenty-
two out of forty-seven) publicly opposed the logic of secularization as 
adopted by the Second Section. In fact, through their cultural and legal 
arguments, these States manifested their position that they politically 
recognized religion and affirmed the special social legitimacy of 
Christianity in European society. 
Furthermore, numerous non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
requested to submit observations to the Court as amici curiae. About 
ten85 were authorized, among which was the European Centre for Law 
and Justice (“ECLJ”).86 
Finally, after the referral of the case, the Second Section’s reasoning, 
including its presuppositions, was later overturned by the final judgment 
of the Grand Chamber which, by fifteen votes to two, held that the public 
school displays of the crucifix did not violate the Convention.87 This was 
not because the Grand Chamber strictly interpreted the Convention, but 
rather because the Second Section's judgment was of a more political or 
ideological nature 
 Interestingly, it was the political reaction caused by the Second 
 
 82. See id. §§ 47–49.  
 83. Id. §§ 8–9. 
 84. These governments are Albania, Austria, Croatia, Hungary, Macedonia (FYRM), 
Moldavia, Norway, Poland, Serbia, Slovakia, and Ukraine. This information may be found in the file 
on the case at the Court’s Registry. 
 85. European Centre for Law and Justice; 33 Members of the European Parliament, together 
with the Alliance Defense Fund; the Greek Helsinki Monitor; Associazione Nazionale del libero 
Pensiero; Eurojuris; in conjunction with International Commission of Jurists, Interights and Human 
Rights Watch; in conjunction with Zentralkomitee des deutschen Katholiken, Semaines sociales de 
France and Associazioni cristiane lavoratori italiani. 
 86. Lautsi, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 8; see also SELECTION OF DOCUMENTS ON THE “CRUCIFIX 
CASE”: LAUTSI AND OTHERS V. ITALY, www.eclj.org/Resources/lautsi/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2012). 
 87. Lautsi, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 32. 
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Section’s decision that resulted in bringing the Court back to a more 
objective and realistic legal path. 
IV. THE REASONING OF THE GRAND CHAMBER 
Overall, the Grand Chamber determined that the crucifix was an 
“essentially passive” religious symbol.88 This is because the mere 
display of a crucifix does not require any “co-action” (coercion) from 
viewers and its impact is not sufficient to constitute a form of 
indoctrination that would infringe pupils’ and parents’ negative freedom 
of religion as guaranteed by the Convention and interpreted by the 
Court.89 In fact, the crucifix’s lack of significant impact should have 
been sufficient to declare the application inadmissible because of the 
absence of any State interference. 
However, the Grand Chamber developed its reasoning in such a way 
as to rule on several controversial aspects of the Second Section’s 
judgment. First, it clarified its own competence (or jurisdiction). Second, 
it clarified its position with regard to secularity, religious neutrality, 
tradition, and majority religion. Finally, it concluded there had been no 
violation of the Convention. 
A. European Court Jurisdiction: Subsidiarity and Margin of 
Appreciation 
In its introduction, the Grand Chamber framed the issues in the case 
and recalled the limits of its jurisdiction. It specified that the only 
question submitted to it regarded the compatibility of a crucifix in Italian 
State-school classrooms with the requirements of Article 2 of Protocol 1 
and Article 9 of the Convention.90 Therefore, the Court did not need to 
rule on the compatibility of the crucifix with the principle of secularity in 
Italian law, nor did it need to arbitrate the disagreement between the 
Italian supreme courts.91 The Grand Chamber endeavored to reaffirm 
that it is not a constitutional or fourth-instance court92 because of its 
 
 88. Id. § 72. 
 89. See id. §§ 71–72. 
 90. Id. § 57. 
 91. Id. 
 92. The following formula sums up what the doctrine of fourth instance entails (see Perlala v. 
Greece, Apo. 17721/04, 2007 Eur. Ct. H.R. 88, § 44):  
25. The Court reiterates that, according to Article 19 of the Convention, its duty is to 
ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the Contracting Parties to the 
Convention. In particular it is not its function to deal with errors of fact or law allegedly 
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subsidiary nature.93 Moreover,  
 
its role is to judge concrete individual cases and not to rule on a 
domestic-law provision in abstracto. 
This clear delineation of the Court’s jurisdiction was necessary in 
light of the reaction to the Second Section judgment. The Second Section 
judgment, pronounced at the beginning of the current process of reform 
of the Court, prompted a very strong reaction from many Member States, 
which considered the judgment to exceed the jurisdiction of the Court 
and to constitute a trespass onto a sovereign State’s political field.94 As a 
result, fierce protests uttered within the Committee of Ministers of the 
Council of Europe impacted the Interlaken Declaration of February 19, 
2010, which was adopted at the end of a high-level conference discussing 
the future of that Court. The Lautsi case was at the heart of those 
discussions. The Interlaken Declaration recalled and “stress[ed] the 
subsidiary nature of the supervisory mechanism established by the 
Convention and notably the fundamental role which national authorities, 
i.e., governments, courts and parliaments, must play in guaranteeing and 
protecting human rights at the national level.”95 Further, the forty-seven 
Member States called for “a strengthening of the principle of 
subsidiarity”96 and invited the Court to “take fully into account its 
subsidiary role in the interpretation and application of the Convention.”97 
This was meant to insist in reminding the Court that its jurisdiction under 
Article 19 cannot go beyond the limits of the general powers that the 
States sovereignly decided to assign to the Court; its jurisdiction is 
limited to controlling the respect by States of their obligations under the 
Convention.98 
 
committed by a national court unless and in so far as they may have infringed rights and 
freedoms protected by the Convention (see, in particular, García Ruiz v. Spain [G.C.], no. 
30544/96, § 28, ECHR 1999-I). It is not the Court’s role to assess itself the facts which 
have led a national court to adopt one decision rather than another. If it were otherwise, 
the Court would be acting as a court of third or fourth instance, which would be to 
disregard the limits imposed on its action.  
 93. Lautsi, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. §§ 61–62. 
 94. See id. §§ 47, 49. 
 95. INTERLAKEN DECLARATION, HIGH LEVEL CONFERENCE ON THE FUTURE OF THE 
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, 19 Feb. 2010, available at 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/capacitybuilding/Source/interlaken_declaration_en.pdf. 
 96. Id. at 2.  
 97. Id. at 5. 
 98. The issue is not closed yet; the Izmir declaration invited the Committee of experts on the 
reform of the Court to continue its work in this direction. 
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According to the Convention, the principle of subsidiarity means that 
“the task of ensuring respect for the rights enshrined in the Convention 
falls primarily on the national authorities of the contracting States, not on 
the Court. It is only in case of default of the national authorities that the 
Court may and must intervene.”99 Thus, the subsidiarity of the ECHR 
institutes a mechanism based on the complementarity between the 
national authorities and the European Court, not on competing 
competences, as in the European Union System. Therefore, the Second 
Section should have respected the autonomy of the Italian legal order 
since it has no power of direct intervention. Further, the Second Section 
should also have respected the national “margin of appreciation,” which 
is one of the main practical applications of the subsidiarity principle. The 
margin of appreciation, which defines “relations between the domestic 
authorities and the Court,”100 allows the Court to apply general 
provisions to specific situations. This concept is based on the simple fact 
that the national authorities, by reason of their direct and continuous 
contact with the vital forces of their countries are in principle better 
placed than an international court to evaluate the various factors of the 
case at issue.101 The margin of appreciation requires the Court to respect 
the discretion of national authorities and to apply the same law to a broad 
variety of situations in an adjusted manner. 
The extent of the margin of appreciation of the State varies according 
to the circumstances, the rights at issue, the political, social, or moral 
sensitivity, and whether a consensus exists between the Member States 
on the solution to apply to the question on point. It helps respect the 
national foundation of every case and prevents the Court from 
pronouncing theoretical and abstract judgments. 
In its judgment, the Second Section failed to respect most of the 
implications of the principle of subsidiarity. Thus, in a surprising and 
rare failure, the Second Section completely and simply left out the 
margin of appreciation analysis, though it is automatic where freedom of 
religion (which is not an absolute right) is concerned. Italy and the 
numerous States which intervened, formally or informally, recalled that 
there was no consensus between them in favor of any religious neutrality 
of State education and, more generally, of society.102 The only consensus 
 
 99. ECHR, Note of the jurisconsult, Principe de subsidiarité, No 3158598, 8 July 2010, 
unpublished. 
 100. A. v. United Kingdom, App. 3455/05, 2009 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 184. 
 101. See for instance, in Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24, 1976 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A). 
 102. See Lautsi v. Italy, App. 30814/06, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. §§ 26–28, 47 (G.C.). 
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concerned the distinction between political and religious areas, not even 
on their separation.103 
B. Secularism is a Philosophical Conviction 
After explaining that it does not have jurisdiction to rule on the 
compatibility of the presence of crucifixes with the principle of 
secularism under Italian law, the Grand Chamber also clarified its 
position with regard to secularism. The Court specified that “the 
supporters of secularism are able to lay claim to views attaining the 
‘level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance’ required for 
them to be considered ‘convictions’ within the meaning of Articles 9 of 
the Convention and 2 of Protocol No. 1.”104 Thus, secularism is a “view” 
or a “philosophical conviction” in the same way as other convictions and 
beliefs worthy of respect.105 Secularism does not have the value of a 
general principle in the Convention system; it is not a binding principle 
stemming from the Convention. This is one of the main contributions of 
the judgment of the Grand Chamber, as it provided a two-edged 
affirmation: the promoters of secularism106 may insist on freedom of 
conscience, but they can invoke it only as one conviction among 
others.107 They must also accept the intrinsic relativity of freedom of 
religion and admit that, under the Convention, secularism cannot claim to 
embody neutrality itself. This does not question secularists’ freedom to 
claim that they hold the ideal system and to try to apply it at the national 
level, according to the circumstances. However, for the Court, secularism 
is a conviction and is respectable since it is compatible with the 
Convention, like many other convictions.108 However, secular conviction 
is not more neutral than a strictly religious belief. In this, the Grand 
Chamber followed the observations of the intervening governments at 
the hearing, which stated that, “favouring secularism was a political 
position that, whilst respectable, was not neutral. Accordingly, in the 
educational sphere, a State that supported the secular as opposed to the 
 
 103. See id. § 47. 
 104. Id. § 58 (citing the judgment of Campbell and Cosans v. the United Kingdom, App. 
7511/76 and 7743/76, 1982 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 36).  
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. The English version of the judgment uses the words “the supporters of secularism.” 
Id. 
 107. See id. 
 108. Id. 
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religious was not being neutral.”109 
 
In its responding observations, the Italian government told the Court 
that  
We firmly believe that, in the absence of a European consensus, the 
Court should refrain from assigning the principle of secularism a 
precise content going as far as prohibiting the mere display of symbols 
with a religious meaning linked to other meanings compatible with the 
underlying values of the Convention.110  
The Grand Chamber went further, however, as it rejected the principle of 
secularism, not as void or evil in itself but as extraneous to the 
Convention system. 
Actually, in international or European law, there is no precise or 
generally accepted definition of secularism. Its content varies 
significantly, as with any notion which is more political or ideological 
than legal. Thus the Court was wise to reject it in favor of the notion of 
neutrality. This rejection significantly weakened the applicants’ 
arguments, which mainly relied on the claim that secularism was a 
necessary consequence of neutrality.111 
C. Neutrality Applies to the “Acting” and Not the “Being” of a State 
Assessing a confessional or denominational school as neutral in 
religious matters as a secular school may seem paradoxical. One way of 
resolving the paradox is to question the relation between nihilism and 
neutrality, which often intuitively leads to confusing the two terms. 
Human minds seem to be configured to think that emptiness is more 
neutral than fullness. Italy and the intervening States amply questioned 
this difference during the hearing.112 To clear up this confusion, which is 
the implicit basis of the Second Section judgment, they recalled that 
there was nothing neutral about the secularism of soviet regimes.113 
Another way of resolving this paradox, much more appropriate to the 
context of the Court, is to consider neutrality as a question of measure. In 
other words, the obligation of neutrality as understood by the Court 
 
 109. Id. § 19–21. See also the oral intervention of the governments of Armenia, Bulgaria, 
Cyprus, Russian Federation, Greece, Lithuania, Malta, and the Republic of San-Marino.  
 110. Complementary Observations of the Italian Government submitted to the Section, § 10. 
 111. Id. §§ 43–44. 
 112. This information may be consulted in the file on the case at the Court’s Registry. 
 113. This information may be consulted in the file on the case at the Court’s Registry. 
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concerns State action, not the State’s nature or identity. The Court does 
not judge the States for what they are but for what they do. On the 
contrary, secularism or denominationalism concerns the nature of the 
State, or its essence. 
Further, neutrality as an essence is difficult, if not impossible, to 
conceive. Because the being precedes the act, requiring a State to be 
neutral is requiring it to never act, and even more, to have no 
presupposition orienting its action, which is also impossible. By 
definition, in order for a State to act, it must choose one action or 
viewpoint over another, so that it can never truly be “neutral.” Every 
State possesses religious or philosophical presuppositions and a culture 
that it cannot renounce without violence. In this sense, a secular State is 
not more neutral than a denominational State. 
The Grand Chamber was thus realistic in recalling, in substance, that 
in religious matters national authorities are only required to act with 
“neutrality and impartiality.”114 The fact that a State is secular, 
denominational, or otherwise has no decisive consequences in itself as to 
whether it is “neutral.” 
Passing judgment on a State’s being, the essence of the State can 
only be assessed with reference to a pre-established conception of the 
common good. Such a judgment presupposes an opinion on the structural 
social conditions favorable for this common good. Therefore, preferring 
a non-confessional school to a Christian-inspired school implies that the 
“values” of atheism or agnosticism are more favorable for the good of 
the pupils than those of Christianity. This was the choice of the Second 
Section when it revealed its view of the aims of State education. 
This choice pertaining to the religious aspect of the common good is 
ultimately a fundamental choice, and the European Court must abstain 
from making it. Those who want the European Court to overstep its 
jurisdiction to exercise such a choice, in fact—in a very medieval way—
long to see it set up as a new spiritual authority above the States: a 
theocracy of the atheistic religion of human rights. In their defense, it is 
true that the absorption of morality and religiosity by human rights 
transforms the European Court into a “conscience of Europe.”115 Thus, 
the Court becomes the functional equivalent of an ultimate oracle of a 
new magisterium, which specifically applies directly to States, not only 
 
 114. Lautsi, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. §§ 71–72. 
 115. As the Court presents itself in the book celebrating its fiftieth anniversary, THE 
CONSCIENCE OF EUROPE: 50 YEARS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (Jonathan Sharpe 
ed. 2011). 
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in civil matters but also in moral and religious matters. This magisterium 
also imposes its positions upon individual consciences because of its 
great prestige. In fact, as any society naturally has a religious dimension, 
a society which claims to be purely secular can only capture the totality 
of spiritual power by transforming the political ideology which rules it 
into religion. 
The Grand Chamber did not choose to implicate such matters, unlike 
the Second Section’s judgment. The Grand Chamber held that, under the 
Convention, the obligation of “neutrality and impartiality” concerns the 
acts of the State, not its nature.116 This is what the Court recalled: “States 
have responsibility for ensuring, neutrally and impartially, the exercise of 
various religions, faiths and beliefs. Their role is to help maintain public 
order, religious harmony and tolerance in a democratic society, 
particularly between opposing groups,”117 whether believers or non-
believers. 
Judge Bonello expressed this view vigorously in his concurring 
opinion: 
Freedom of religion is not secularism. Freedom of religion is not the 
separation of Church and State. Freedom of religion is not religious 
equidistance – all seductive notions, but of which no one has so far 
appointed this Court to be the custodian. In Europe, secularism is 
optional, freedom of religion is not.118 
Freedom of religion, and freedom from religion, in substance, consist in 
the rights to profess freely any religion of the individual’s choice, the 
right to freely change one’s religion, the right not to embrace any 
religion at all, and the right to manifest one’s religion by means of 
belief, worship, teaching and observance. Here the Convention 
catalogue grinds to a halt, well short of the promotion of any State 
secularism.119 
Thus, determining the essence of the State, secular, confessional, or 
otherwise, is not something that the European Court is competent to 
decide, as demonstrated by the Grand Chamber’s express refusal to 
arbitrate the Italian domestic debate on the meaning of secularism.120 
 
 116. See Lautsi, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. at §§ 71–72. 
 117. Id. at § 60. (citing Leyla Şahin v. Turkey, App. 44774/98, 2005 Eur. Ct. H.R. at § 107). 
 118. Id. at § 2.5 (Bonham, J., concurring). 
 119. Id. at § 2.6. 
 120. See id. at § 57. 
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D. Democracy, Denominational Neutrality and Secularism 
The Second Section could not “see how the display in State-school 
classrooms of a symbol that it is reasonable to associate with Catholicism 
(the majority religion in Italy could serve the educational pluralism 
which was essential for the preservation of ‘democratic society’ within 
the Convention meaning of that term.”121 Thus, the requirement of 
confessional neutrality of the school environment allegedly derives from 
the concept of “educative pluralism,” which itself stems from the 
interpretation of the notion of “democratic society.” The result is that a 
society must be secular to be democratic. This is in substance what the 
applicants claimed: “the principle of secularism coincides with the 
principle of democracy. A non-secular State could not be considered 
democratic.”122 
This opinion is conceivable from a philosophical point of view, 
provided democracy is considered necessarily liberal by nature, as it is 
presently in most western States. Indeed, the principles of liberalism 
ultimately imply a certain moral relativism, and consequently a 
privatization of religion. According to this view, Western democracies 
are thus secular, at least in their essence, and become concretely so as 
they manifestly adhere to moral liberalism. This is why the applicants 
say the presence of a crucifix is “incompatible with the foundations of 
western political thought, the principles of the liberal State and a 
pluralist, open democracy, and respect for the individual rights and 
freedoms enshrined in the Italian Constitution and the Convention.”123 
Though this position is defensible from a philosophical perspective, 
it is much less so from the legal point of view of the Convention. 
Ideologically, the Court is largely in favor of liberal democracy, but there 
is no such unanimity among the Member States of the Council. 
Moreover, historically the Council of Europe is not based on such an 
ideology but on the post WWII Christian democracy. This Christian-
democratic origin appears especially in the Statute of the Council of 
Europe. In its preamble, the Member States affirm “their devotion to the 
spiritual and moral values which are the common heritage of their 
peoples and the true source of individual freedom, political liberty and 
the rule of law, principles which form the basis of all genuine 
 
 121. Id. § 31. 
 122. Observations of the applicants for the hearing of June 30, 2010, p. 6. 
 123. Lautsi, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 46. This is an extract of the presentation of the applicant’s 
position by the Court. Therefore, it is not a direct quotation of the applicant. 
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democracy.”124 
Actually, the Convention is not only a set of objective standards, but 
a system of standards which constitutes an evolutional ideological 
system that is superposed to the legal system and guides its 
interpretation. What was at stake in the Lautsi case, then, was the 
determination of the ideological system, either liberal or Christian-
democratic, directing the interpretation of the Convention. 
When the European Convention on Human Rights was written, a 
large proportion of the Member States of the Council of Europe 
designated an official religion or exclusively referred to its majority 
religion. It is still the case today, although less so for Catholic countries, 
as shown by the situation in Andorra, as well as in the Armenian,125 
Danish,126 Greek,127 Hungarian,128 Irish,129 Icelandic,130 
Liechtenstein,131 Maltese,132 Monegasque,133 Norwegian,134 United 
Kingdom135 or Slovakian136 constitutions. Other States, like Spain or 
 
 124. Statute of the Council of Europe, London, 5 May 1949, Preamble, § 3. 
 125. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA, July 5, 1995, art. 8.1 (stating that “[t]he 
Republic of Armenia recognizes the exclusive mission of the Armenian Apostolic Holy Church as a 
national church, in the spiritual life, development of the national culture and preservation of the 
national identity of the people of Armenia”). 
 126. DANMARKS RIGES GRUNDLOV [CONSTITUTION], June 5, 1953, part 1, § 4 (stating that 
“[t]he Evangelical Lutheran Church shall be the Established Church of Denmark, and, as such, it 
shall be supported by the State”). 
 127. SYNTAGMA [SYN.] [CONSTITUTION], April 17, 2001, 2 (Greece) (stating that “[t]he 
prevailing religion in Greece is that of the Eastern Orthodox Church of Christ”). 
 128. A MAGYAR KOZTARSASAG ALKOTMANYA [CONSTITUTION], April 25, 2011 (Hungary). 
 129. The Irish Constitution, written “[i]n the Name of the Most Holy Trinity, from Whom is 
all authority and to Whom, as our final end, all actions both of men and States must be referred, We, 
the people of Éire, Humbly acknowledging all our obligations to our Divine Lord, Jesus Christ, Who 
sustained our fathers through centuries of trial.” The preamble recalls in Article 44 that “[t]he State 
acknowledges that the homage of public worship is due to Almighty God. It shall hold His Name in 
reverence, and shall respect and honour religion.” BUNREACHT NA HEIREANN [CONSTITUTION], Dec. 
19, 1937, preamble (Ireland). 
 130. STJÓRNARSKRÁ LÝDVELDISINS ÍSLANDS [CONSTITUTION], June 17, 1944, art. 62 (Ice.) 
(stating that “[t]he Evangelical Lutheran Church shall be the State Church in Iceland and, as such, it 
shall be supported and protected by the State”). 
 131. LIECH. CONST., Oct. 5, 1921, art. 37, § 2. (stating that Catholicism is the State religion).  
 132. MALTA CONST., Sep. 21, 1964, art. 2 (stating that the religion of Malta is the Roman 
Catholic Apostolic religion). 
 133. MONACO CONST., Dec. 17, 1962, art. 9 (stating that the Roman Catholic Apostolic 
religion is the State religion). 
 134. KONGERIKET NORGES GRUNNLOV [CONSTITUTION], May 17, 1814, art. 2 (Nor.) (stating 
that “[t]he Evangelical-Lutheran religion shall remain the official religion of the State. The 
inhabitants professing it are bound to bring up their children in the same”). 
              135. In the United-Kingdom, since Henry VIII's Act of Supremacy declaring that Henry VIII 
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Italy, also recognize Catholicism in a special way.137 
It must be underlined that officially recognizing a specific religion 
does not imply denying the freedom of religion of those belonging to 
minority groups. It only implies accepting that freedom of religion, like 
any other freedom, is exercised in a specific cultural context. 
Affirming that a democratic State is necessarily secular is unrealistic; 
moreover, it infringes the sovereignty of the Member States which have 
never undertaken such an obligation. However, lack of realism is not 
always seen as a default in itself; imposing another reality is the issue. 
Such an affirmation even claims to be avant-gardiste, indeed even 
prophetic. This could be accepted if one considered that these religious 
constitutional provisions are only vestiges of a past political order. 
However, some countries formalize the relations between temporal 
and spiritual orders in their constitutions. For example, the Bulgarian 
constitution of 1991 states that “Eastern Orthodox religion is the 
traditional religion of the Republic of Bulgaria.”138 Very recently, the 
new constitution of Hungary, symbolically promulgated on Easter 
Monday 2011 (April 25), frequently refers to Catholicism and the values 
of Christian Europe which must guide the interpretation of the 
Constitution.139 
Finally, the interventions of twenty-one Member States to support 
Italy demonstrate that the postmodern model of liberal democracy, cut 
off from its cultural and religious roots, has not entirely conquered 
Europe. It may even be drawing back, due to the social and cultural 
constraints imposed by globalization. 
Identifying democracy and secularism also raised a problem 
concerning the coherence of the European Court’s case-law. The Second 
Section judgment was contrary to the case-law of the Commission and 
 
was "the only supreme head on earth of the Church in England" and that the English crown shall 
enjoy "all honours, dignities, preeminences, jurisdictions, privileges, authorities, immunities, profits, 
and commodities to the said dignity," the English crown holds both the office of the Head of State 
and the Head of the Church of England. Act of Supremacy, 1534, 26 Hen. 8 c.1 (Eng.). Some seats 
in the House of Lords are also reserved for some bishops of the Church of England. 
 136. ÚSTAVA SLOVENSKEJ REPUBLIKY [CONSTITUTION], Sep. 1, 1992, preamble (recognizing 
the spiritual heritage of the saints Cyril and Methodius). 
 137. SPAIN CONST., Dec. 29, 1978, § 2 (stating that the public authorities shall “maintain 
appropriate cooperation relations with the Catholic Church); COSTITUZIONE DELLA REPUBBLICA 
ITALIANA,, Dec. 22, 1947, art. 7 (recognizing the Catholic Church as a sovereign, whose relations 
with the State are governed by pacts and do not require constitutional procedures).  
 138. KONSTITUTSIYA NA REPUBLIKA BALGARIYA [CONSTITUTION], July 12, 1991, art. 14. 
 139. See A MAGYAR KOZTARSASAG ALKOTMANYA [CONSTITUTION], April 25, 2011 
(Hungary). 
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the Court. As early as the case of Darby v. Sweden, the former European 
Commission of Human Rights held that a State Church system cannot in 
itself be considered to violate Article 9 of the Convention.140 More 
recently, in the famous judgment of Leyla Sahin, the Grand Chamber 
affirmed that “[w]here questions concerning the relationship between 
State and religions are at stake, on which opinion in a democratic society 
may reasonably differ widely, the role of the national decision-making 
body must be given special importance.”141 Since deep disagreements 
about the relationship between State and religion may reasonably exist in 
a democratic society, one cannot see how the notion of democratic 
society could impose a unique secular model of State education. 
Finally, it clearly appears that, in the context of the European 
Convention, democracy does not imply secularism. The efforts of the 
Italian government to prove that the crucifix—as a symbol of 
civilization—supports secularism, instead of opposing it, finally proved 
useless. The issue was relevant in the domestic debate, but off topic 
before the European Court. The government’s presentation still held 
merit however, describing an original concept of secularism that respects 
the culture of society instead of aggressively stirring conflict within it. 
E. State Education According to the Grand Chamber 
After delineating its jurisdiction, the Grand Chamber still had to 
correct the general presentation of the Second Section on the aims of 
State education. As already mentioned, the Section built its reasoning on 
specific assertions about the aims of State education. Consequently, its 
legal reasoning depended on the asserted purposes. However, before 
discussing its legal arguments, the Grand Chamber responded by briefly 
recalling what the Convention actually requires with regards to State 
education. 
Regarding the Convention’s State education requirements, the Court 
first recalled that, according to its case law, the setting of the curriculum 
“fall[s] within the competence of the Contracting States.”142 Like the 
Section, the Grand Chamber deduced from Article 2 of Protocol 1 a duty 
of the State “to safeguard the possibility of pluralism in education,”143 
but, contrary to what the Second Section maintained, this pluralism does 
 
 140. Darby v. Sweden, App. 11581/85, Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. (1988). 
 141. Leyla Şahin v. Turkey, App. 44774/98, 2005 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 109. 
 142. Lautsi v. Italy, App. 30814/06, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 62 (G.C.). 
 143. Id. 
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not imply religious neutrality;144 it is not intrinsically relativistic. The 
Grand Chamber ended the political discussion on purpose to return to the 
legal field of State obligations. Referring to its well established case law 
in this area,145 the Court recalled that the Convention ”does not even 
permit parents to object to the integration of such teaching [of a religious 
or philosophical kind] or education in the school curriculum.”146 The 
Convention simply requires the State to ensure that “information or 
knowledge included in the curriculum is conveyed in an objective, 
critical and pluralistic manner, enabling pupils to develop a critical mind 
particularly with regard to religion in a calm atmosphere free of any 
proselytism. The State is forbidden to pursue an aim of indoctrination 
that might be considered as not respecting parents’ religious and 
philosophical convictions.”147 This prohibition not only concerns the 
curriculum, but also all the functions of the State with regard to 
education and teaching,148 including the setting of the school 
environment.149 
The duties thus described by the Grand Chamber do not distinguish 
between the secular or religious character of State schools. They concern 
both systems equally. Neither secular systems nor those which recognize 
some religious dimension in State-education are contrary to the 
Convention. For example, in Liechtenstein, the State co-operates with the 
Church and parents in order to transmit a religious and moral 
education.150 Consequently, State schools endeavor to educate pupils in 
conformity with Christian principles, together with the Church and 
parents. Similarly, in Poland, the law provides that the curriculum in 
State schools must respect Christian values and universal moral 
principles.151 The choice of the secular or confessional character for 
State schools remains outside the Convention’s scope and falls under 
each State’s sovereignty. 
After declaring that the concepts of secularism and confessional 
 
 144. Id. at §§ 71–72. 
 145. See, e.g., Folgerø v. Norway, App. 15472/02, 2007 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 84; Zengin v. Turkey, 
App. 1448/04, 2007 Eur. Ct. H.R. §§ 51–52; Kjeldsen v. Denmark, App. 5095/71; 5920/72; 5926/72, 
1976 Eur. Ct. H.R. §§ 50–53. 
 146. Lautsi, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 62. 
 147. Id. 
 148. See Folgerø, 2007 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 84; Zengin, 2007 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 49; Valsamis v. 
Greece, App. 21787/93, 1996 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 27; Kjeldsen,,1976 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 50. 
 149. Lautsi, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 62. 
 150. LIECH. CONST., Oct. 5, 1921, art. 15. 
 151. Preamble of the Polish School Education Act of September 7, 1991. 
PUPPINCK.MRO2 2/8/2013 2:41 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2012 
900 
neutrality are outside the Convention’s scope, and after recalling the 
duties of the State with regard to State education, the Court then reached 
the merits of the case. 
F. The Crucifix: A Passive Symbol 
The Court first explained that the obligation incumbent on States 
under Article 2 of Protocol 1 concerns not only the curriculum, but also 
the organization of the State school environment.152 Thus, a decision 
concerning the presence of a crucifix falls within an area in which the 
States are obligated to respect the right of parents to ensure that the 
education and teaching of their children is in conformity with their own 
religious and philosophical convictions. Then the Court recognized that 
the crucifix is “above all a religious symbol.”153 As such, it could 
possibly affect the rights of parents through its potential impact on the 
education of children.154 
Contrary to the Second Section’s decision, which determined that the 
crucifix was a “powerful external symbol” and could therefore infringe 
the religious rights of parents and the religious freedom of children, the 
Grand Chamber declared that it was “an essentially passive symbol.”155 
 
According to the Section, “in the context of public education, 
crucifixes, which it was impossible not to notice in classrooms, were 
necessarily perceived as an integral part of the school environment and 
could therefore be considered ‘powerful external symbols.’”156 More 
precisely, it was allegedly a powerful symbol because it is linked to the 
school environment and would give pupils the feeling of being brought 
up in an environment marked by a particular religion supported by the 
State.157 In the Section’s view, the context was decisive: the crucifix is 
not only a powerful symbol because it is religious, but also because it is 
endorsed by the State and imposed by State schools. 
In its argument, the Italian Government developed the concept of a 
“passive symbol” not in order to denigrate the crucifix, but to distinguish 
the Lausti case from other cases about compulsory religious teaching or 
 
 152. Lautsi, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 63 (citing Folgerø, 2007 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 84); Zengin, 2007 
Eur. Ct. H.R. § 49; Valsamis, 1996 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 27; Kjeldsen, 1976 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 50. 
 153. Lautsi, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 66. 
 154. See id. 
 155. Id. § 72. 
 156. Id. § 73. 
 157. Lautsi v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06, 2009 Eur. Ct. H.R. §§ 53, 56 (2d Sec.). 
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religious oath-taking158 that concern “active” religious steps. The 
Government explained that the symbol was passive, because it did not 
require any action, prayer, or reverence from those who view it.159 
Moreover, it is not linked to school curricula.160 For these reasons, the 
crucifix is a passive symbol. It does not mean that the meaning of the 
crucifix is weak or insignificant. 
This is also how the Grand Chamber understood the crucifix’s 
passive character: the crucifix is passive because “it cannot be deemed to 
have an influence on pupils comparable to that of didactic speech or 
participation in religious activities.”161 
I think that the concept of a “passive symbol” is not contradictory 
with that of “powerful external symbols,” although it is often affirmed 
that such is the case. The concept of a passive symbol is opposite to that 
of an “active symbol,” while a “powerful external symbol” is opposite to 
a “weak external symbol.” A national anthem could be an example of an 
active symbol because it represents the nation and (sometimes) requires 
those who hear it to stand with their hands on their hearts and sing. On 
the other hand, a “weak external symbol” may be a religious jewel worn 
around one’s neck—such as David’s star, a cross, or Fatima’s hand—the 
impact of which is weak on other people. In addition of being a weak 
external symbol, such religious jewelry is also a passive symbol because 
it requires no action on the part of others. 
In addition, this distinction between signs and symbols, according to 
whether they are powerful or weak, passive or active, will probably be 
useful in the future to distinguish other situations. The context of the 
display, especially cultural context, helps determine the strength of an 
external religious symbol: the impact of the public display of an Islamic 
head scarf definitely varies according to the circumstances. It is a more 
powerful external symbol in Bavaria than in Ankara. 
G. No Interference by the State 
Acknowledging that the crucifix was passive was sufficient for the 
Court to rule that the crucifix’s impact was too limited to restrict the 
rights invoked. The Court could have concluded there was no 
interference by the State concerning the rights at issue. However, the 
 
 158. See, e.g., Buscarini v. San Marino, App. 24645/94, 1999 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
 159. Lautsi, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 36. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. § 72. 
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Grand Chamber went further, stating that the applicants had not proved 
there was any impact on the pupils or on their mother. 
Concerning the pupils, the Grand Chamber noted that, 
 
There is no evidence before the Court that the display of a religious symbol 
on classroom walls may have an influence on pupils and so it cannot 
reasonably be asserted that it does or does not have an effect on young 
persons whose convictions are still in the process of being formed.162 
 
Concerning their mother, the impact of the crucifix was not 
established either. Although the Court could perceive the applicant’s 
apprehension, it nevertheless rejected the applicant’s argument: “Be that 
as it may, the applicant’s subjective perception is not in itself sufficient 
to establish a breach of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1.”163 
The Grand Chamber also rejected the Second Section’s argument 
that the display of the crucifix resulted in the “emotional disturbance.”164 
The Grand Chamber reasoned that emotional disturbance is only a 
“subjective perception,” which is not in itself sufficient to establish a 
breach of Article 2 of Protocol 1.165 The Convention does not protect 
subjective perceptions. 
This simple statement was sufficient to conclude that there was no 
infringement of the rights at issue. When the Court observes that there 
has been no infringement, it usually concludes that the application is 
inadmissible166 Indeed, the examination of the compatibility of a 
restriction with a guaranteed right of the Convention is possible only if 
there is such an infringement of this right. Therefore, the Court might 
have, early in the process, stated that there was no proof of an 
infringement and declared the application inadmissible. It would 
certainly have done so if Lautsi had been an ordinary case.167 
The reference the Section made to the potential risk of emotional 
disturbance to the pupils because of the crucifix168 was one of the most 
 
 162.   Id. § 66. 
 163. Id. § 72. 
 164. Id. § 36. 
 165. Id. § 66. 
 166. See, e.g,. X. v. Federal Republic of Germany, App. 7462/76, 1977 Eur. Ct. H R. (G.C.). 
 167. The Second Section could, and strictly speaking should have limited its analysis to the 
effect of the crucifix. Instead, it preferred to redefine the whole education paradigm and establish an 
obligation of neutrality.  
 168. Lautsi, App. 30814/06, 2009 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 55 (2d Sec.). 
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flagrantly weak points of its reasoning. The impossibility of proving that 
the mere presence of the crucifix constituted indoctrination required the 
Section to uphold the hypothesis of the “emotional disturbance”: its 
function was to prove the impact of the crucifix on the children. 
However, this prejudice was purely hypothetical and required a 
presupposition that the presence of a religious symbol in the school 
environment was illegitimate. According to the Second Section, this 
prejudice was established through potential psycho-social pressure.169 
The mere possibility of interpreting a symbol in such a way as to make 
one feel as though he were in a marked environment is insufficient to 
constitute an infringement of the pupils’ conscience and the parents’ 
ability to exercise influence regarding convictions. Some compulsory 
biology classes are much more likely to disturb children emotionally and 
offend their parents’ convictions. In such cases, the Court did not 
consider that such an emotional disturbance could violate parents’ 
rights.170 The only duty of the authorities is to make sure the convictions 
of parents “are not disregarded at this level by carelessness, lack of 
judgment or misplaced proselytism.”171 
The slight impact of the crucifix is the real ratio decidendi, and after 
this assessment, the Court could have abstained from going further. 
However, considering the implications of this case, it was politically 
inconceivable that the Court abstain from deciding the case. It would 
have been interpreted as evading the issue. Consequently, the Grand 
Chamber continued its analysis and established that, even supposing 
there had been an infringement of the rights at issue, its holding was 
justified under the Convention. The Court had to examine the substance 
of the debate and rule on the merits. 
In any case, considering the limited impact of the crucifix and, 
consequently, the absence of interference, the Grand Chamber was right 
in deciding no distinct question arose under Article 9 concerning the 
freedom of religion of the children. 
Some commentators criticized the Court for having examined the 
case mainly through perspective of the right of parents, rather than 
through a thorough examination of the children’s rights under Article 9, 
 
 169. “In countries where the great majority of the population owe allegiance to one particular 
religion, the manifestation of the observances and symbols of that religion, without restriction as to 
place and manner, may constitute pressure on students who do not practise that religion or those who 
adhere to another religion.” Id. § 50. 
 170. E.g., Kjeldsen v. Denmark, App. 5095/71, 5920/72, 5926/72, 1976 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
 171. Id. § 54. 
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where such an examination could have led to a different result.172 
However, the Court justified its position from the beginning, recalling 
that Article 2 of Protocol 1 is in principle lex specialis in relation to 
Article 9173 when the dispute concerns the obligation to respect the 
convictions of parents in education and teaching.174 
I agree with the Court. Because the Convention does not require any 
confessional neutrality, the lack of constraint exercised by the State on 
the applicants suffices to conclude there was no violation of Article 9. 
Finally, concerning Article 14, which prohibits discriminatory 
treatment, especially on religious grounds, the Court merely recalled that 
this provision has no independent existence and only concerns the 
enjoyment of the rights guaranteed by the Convention.175 The Court also 
noted that no distinct question arose that was not already examined.176 
Moreover, the applicants did not substantiate this complaint.177 
V. SUPPLEMENTARY COMMENTS ON THE GRAND CHAMBER JUDGMENT 
Since the applicants failed to prove State interference through 
asserting their claimed rights, as already mentioned, the Grand Chamber 
could have dismissed the case as inadmissible. However, the Court 
preferred pursuing its reasoning, giving more detail and its position on 
some points at issue that we will comment in the following 
developments, in particular on the distinction between the crucifix and 
the Islamic headscarf, the definition of the negative freedom of religion 
of non-believers, the exclusion of the Bavarian solution, the weight of 
social realities such as the traditions and of the majority religion as 
legitimate interests justifying interferences in individual rights. Finally 
this Article will also present and analyse the political and religious 
implications of the debate caused by the Lautsi case, as well as its 
consequences for the Court. 
A. The Crucifix and the Islamic Headscarf 
To support its decision, the Second Section referenced the judgment 
 
 172. Jeroen Temperman, Lautsi II: A Lesson in Burying Fundamental Children’s Rights, 6 
RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS – AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL 279 (2011). 
 173. Folgerø v. Norway, App. 15472/02, 2007 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 84. 
 174. Lautsi, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 59. 
 175. Id. § 81. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
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in Dahlab v. Switzerland,178 but without much detail.179 This case 
concerned prohibiting a State school teacher from wearing an Islamic 
headscarf while teaching.180 The Court considered the headscarf to be a 
powerful external sign and ruled that the prohibition was compatible with 
the Convention.181 On this basis, the Section, as well as some 
commentators, deduced that it was logical, and even just, to prohibit the 
display of crucifixes too. 
The Grand Chamber expressly rejected this reasoning: “The Grand 
Chamber does not agree with that approach. It considers that that 
decision cannot serve as a basis in this case because the facts of the two 
cases are entirely different.”182 The Grand Chamber clarified this aspect 
of the debate to avoid being accused of being prejudiced against Islam. 
Dahlab differs from Lautsi on several aspects: 
First of all, prohibitions against wearing religious signs or clothes 
constitute an interference with the individual freedom to manifest one’s 
beliefs because the person is prevented from acting in conformity with 
his beliefs. It was for the Court to determine the compatibility of this 
interference with the Convention. Conversely, in the Lautsi case, nobody 
was prevented from acting, nor was anyone forced to act. Strictly 
speaking, the Italian government did not have to justify any co-action 
(coercion), or any infringement of the applicants’ internal or external 
liberty. There was no violation of the students’ external liberty, because 
the pupils were not forced to act against their conscience. Nor were they 
prevented from acting in conformity with their conscience. Similarly, the 
students’ internal liberty, along with the mother’s right to ensure her 
children’s education conformed with her convictions, were not violated 
because the children were not forced to believe anything. Nor were her 
children prevented from believing anything. They were not indoctrinated 
and did not suffer from any proselytism. 
Further, in the Dahlab case the Court reasoned that the will of the 
Swiss authorities to ensure the religious neutrality of State education and 
protect the religious beliefs of the pupils, in conformity with domestic 
law, was a legitimate interest that justified the decision of the Swiss 
authorities to prohibit headscarf wearing. This measure did not go 
 
 178. Dahlab v. Switzerland, App. 42393/98, 2001 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
 179. Lautsi v. Italy, App. 30814/06, 2009 Eur. Ct. H.R. §54 (2d Sec.), rev’d, App. 30814/06, 
2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. (G.C.). 
 180. Dahlab, 2001 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 1. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Lautsi v. Italy, App. 30814/06, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 73 (G.C.). 
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beyond the national margin of appreciation in this area. 
However, the fact that the prohibition of a religious symbol is 
compatible with the Convention does not mean that the authorization of 
that religious symbol would be incompatible. The power to prohibit does 
not create an obligation to prohibit. States which do not prohibit wearing 
religious symbols at school do not violate the Convention. 
 
Moreover, unlike Switzerland, Italian domestic law does not clearly 
enshrine secularism. Therefore, the parties before the Court could not 
claim that Italy must respect its domestic law in this regard. Conversely, 
Italy boasted of its tolerant and inclusive attitude towards other religions 
and their symbols,183 showing again that its concept of secularism differs 
from that of other countries, like France or Turkey. Theoretically at least, 
a teacher wearing a kippa could teach pupils wearing veils and turbans in 
a classroom that has a crucifix mounted on the blackboard. 
Finally, symbols differ with regard to their meaning and their 
cultural context. Symbols do not have the same impact, and sometimes 
the same meaning, depending on the cultural context in which they are 
displayed. The crucifix is in its own cultural context in Italy, which is not 
the same as an Islamic headscarf’s cultural context in Switzerland. 
Religious symbols cannot be correctly understood if one ignores the 
cultural context. The Dahlab Court was explicit on this point, stating that 
it was difficult “to reconcile the wearing of an Islamic headscarf with the 
message of tolerance, respect for others and, above all, equality and non-
discrimination that all teachers in a democratic society must convey to 
their pupils.”184 For the Court, this compatibility problem justified the 
headscarf prohibition in the non-confessional education system. 
This compatibility issue did not arise in the Lautsi case, but not 
because the crucifix is per se compatible with European and civilized 
values. The Court found no compatibility issue because Italy does not 
have to justify the crucifix’s presence, which is a matter within the scope 
of its margin of appreciation. A crucifix in itself does not infringe any 
individual rights. Thus, the Court’s decision only concerned the concrete 
impact of the crucifix, this impact being partly determined by the 
crucifix’s meaning. 
 
 183. Id. § 74. 
 184. Dahlab, 2001 Eur. Ct. H.R., § 1. 
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B. Negative Freedom of Religion of Non-Believers 
In examining the display of the crucifix through its concrete impact 
on the applicants, and not from the general view of State education aims, 
the Grand Chamber avoided giving negative freedom of religion a 
general impact on the school environment as a whole. The negative 
freedom of religion remains limited to the safeguard of the individual 
sphere, that is to say the absence of co-action constraining the internal or 
external liberty. The extension of a negative freedom to the environment 
would have established a “confessional neutrality” obligation under the 
Convention. 
The Grand Chamber refused to give symmetrical weight to the 
positive and negative aspects of freedom of religion. Indeed, it is 
important to make sure the respect of the negative freedom is not 
guaranteed at the expense of the positive exercise of the right. The Court 
already explained this principle in the famous case of Pretty v. the United 
Kingdom185 concerning euthanasia. In that case, the Court refused to 
grant the applicant the benefit of a “diametrically opposite right, namely 
a right to die,”186 i.e. a negative right to life. In Lautsi, the negative 
freedom concerned a purely subjective matter, that one may feel 
offended by some words, caricature, or symbols, while others may not. 
Generally, there is no fundamental right not to be offended or upset 
under the Convention. 
Finally, the Court refused to endorse a complete conceptual reversal 
of freedom of religion against itself. This conceptual reversal, which 
supposed that the freedom of some could be ruined by the manifestation 
of the religion of others,187 was denounced by the Italian Government 
before the Grand Chamber as the main “scandal” in the case: 
What is scandalous in this case is the negation of freedom of religion in 
the name of freedom of religion! It is this claim to defend freedom of 
religion by socially banning religion! It is the will of extending the 
negative dimension of freedom of religion until negating its positive 
dimension!188 
C. Bavarian Nonsolution 
“The Bavarian solution” is an observation worth noting in analyzing 
 
 185. App. 2346/02, 2002 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
 186. Id. § 35. 
 187. Pleading of the Italian Government before the Grand Chamber, June 30, 2010, § 24–26. 
 188. Pleading of the Italian Government before the Grand Chamber, June 30, 2010, § 4. 
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Lautsi. After a decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court189 
that judged the presence of crucifixes in classrooms as “contrary to the 
principle of the State’s neutrality and difficult to reconcile with the 
freedom of religion of children who were not Catholics,”190 the Bavarian 
Parliament adopted a new ordinance. This ordinance, known as the 
“Bavarian solution,” provided parents the opportunity to cite their 
convictions to challenge the presence of crucifixes in classrooms 
attended by their children.191 It introduced a mechanism whereby, if 
necessary, a compromise or a personalised solution could be reached. In 
practice, this mechanism consists of a crucifix’s temporary removal 
during objecting pupils’ attendance. 
In the Lautsi case, many wanted to focus the defense’s argument on 
the fact that the decision to maintain the crucifix resulted from a vote by 
the school’s governing body.192 On April 22 and May 27, 2002, the 
school’s governing body discussed the applicants’ request to remove the 
crucifix.193 The governing body rejected the request, ten votes to two 
with one abstention.194 After this vote, the applicants suggested that the 
crucifix be removed during school holidays, which was also refused.195 
This process resembled the Bavarian solution. 
This approach was based on a certain conception of neutrality, 
according to which, in a de facto situation (here, involving the presence 
of a crucifix), the State should refrain from being involved either to 
impose or to prohibit. It should instead let those who are directly 
interested decide: pupils, parents, and teachers. This is one argument 
made by the Italian Government in its written observations to the Grand 
Chamber. It explained that this mechanism “could be the authentic 
expression of the principles of equality, equidistance, [and] 
neutrality.”196 Conversely, and contrary to the Bavarian practice, the 
Government argued that the crucifix should not be removed by right on a 
 
 189. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 16, 1995, 
BVERFGE 93, 1 (Ger.). 
 190. Lautsi v. Italy, App. 30814/06, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 28 (G.C.). 
 191. Id. 
 192. Lautsi, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 40. The school’s governing body has competence to manage 
the school; it is an elected collegial organ, prescribed by law and composed of representatives of the 
teachers, parents, pupils, and administrative staff of the school. See id. 
 193. Id. § 11. 
 194. Id. 
 195. As indicated by the Government in its written submission to the Grand Chamber for the 
oral hearing. 
 196. Application of the Italian Government to the Grand Chamber, p. 11, §§ 22, 23. 
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mere individual request, because that would manifest a prejudice in favor 
of the secular ideology.197 Any removal or implementation should result 
only from a vote of the governing body. Though a vote has the necessary 
effect of imposing the majority’s decision on the minority, only a vote 
will be able to ensure respect for “pluralism and democracy [that] are, by 
the nature of things, based on a compromise that requires various 
concessions by individuals and groups of individuals.”198 
The opinions on the appropriateness of this approach were divided 
because it implied that the legitimacy of the display of the crucifix would 
be invalidated. Moreover, it implied that the presence of the crucifix 
itself would always breach the rights of non-Christians. On the contrary, 
the determination by vote gave the advantage of making the compulsory 
display of the crucifix a relative question. Indeed, the compulsory 
character of the display of the crucifix might well be considered 
excessive by the Court when examining the merits, especially the 
proportionality of the alleged infringement of the applicants’ rights. The 
fact that this mechanism was an occasional process not “prescribed by 
law”199 was a relative weakness of the argument because the Court does 
not have the authority to judge the law of a State, but rather, only the 
facts of the case at issue. 
Finally, the Government presented this argument only secondarily, 
preferring to focus on the legitimacy of the presence of the crucifix under 
the Convention principles. The Grand Chamber might have relied on the 
vote of the school’s governing body to adopt a judgment of compromise: 
no condemnation of Italy, which would have satisfied the public opinion, 
but an invitation to modify its domestic law to make this voting 
procedure systematic, which would have satisfied the promoters of 
secularism. The Grand Chamber did not choose this solution, perhaps 
because, in spite of its apparent ease, the result would have enshrined the 
pre-eminence of a democratic vote over individual rights. 
In addition to the Bavarian solution, it seems that the Court 
considered declaring the case inadmissible for failing to exhaust 
domestic remedies. This consideration appeared in a letter dated June 8, 
2010 in which the Registry requested that the Parties specify whether 
“the applicant has submitted a claim concerning Article 2 of Protocol 1 
to the domestic courts,” and whether, “even if the issue has not been 
 
 197. Application of the Italian Government to the Grand Chamber, p. 11, §§ 22, 23. 
 198. Gorzelik v. Poland , App. 44158/98, 2001 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 66. See also Refah Partisi v. 
Turkey, App. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98, 41344/98, 2003 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 99. 
 199. Convention, supra note 7, at art. 9 § 2.  
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raised in front of or by the Section, the parties consider that the 
application should be declared inadmissible for non-exhaustion of 
domestic remedies.”200 In this letter, the Court drew the Parties’ 
attention, especially the Government’s, to a possible end of the conflict. 
In its submission to the Grand Chamber during the hearing, the 
Government decided to avoid this resolution and expressly requested the 
Court to judge the case on the merits. 
Thus, the Grand Chamber judged the case on the merits, and even 
ruled on issues that were not necessary because a finding of no State 
interference was sufficient to resolve the case. The Grand Chamber 
carefully pursued clarifications on other controversial issues. In 
particular, it specifically considered the State’s ability to justify 
interference in Conventional rights in regard to traditions and the 
majority religion. 
D. Tradition 
In support of their argument, the Italian government and the 
intervening governments requested that the Court respect and not abolish 
a tradition.201 Beyond respect for ethnic diversity and even the 
“pluralism” of European cultures demanded by the Court, the real 
question raised concerned the relationship between pre-modern 
traditional customs and values, and the modern (even sometimes post-
modern) values promoted by the Court. 
On this issue, the Court was very clear that although the decision to 
perpetuate a tradition in principle falls within the margin of appreciation 
of the State, considering the European cultural and religious diversity, 
“the reference to a tradition cannot relieve a Contracting State of its 
obligation to respect the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Convention 
and its Protocols.”202 The values of the Convention prevail over 
traditions. 
For the Court, the fact that a custom has become traditional, in a 
social and historical sense, does not deprive it of its religious nature.203 
Even more, in some Islamic cases, the Court had the opportunity to 
conclude that some traditions were not compatible with the values of the 
 
 200. This document may be consulted in the file on the case at the Court’s Registry. 
 201. See Lautsi v. Italy, App. 30814/06, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 36 (G.C.). 
 202. Id. § 68. 
 203. Buscarini v. San-Marino, App. 24645/94, 1999 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 34 (holding that requiring 
elected representatives to take a traditional oath on the Gospels violated Article 9). 
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Convention as understood by the Court. Although the Court has held that 
the fundamental principle of the freedom of religion “excludes any 
discretion on the part of the State to determine whether religious beliefs 
or the means used to express such beliefs are legitimate,”204 it has 
concluded several times205 “that sharia is incompatible with the 
fundamental principles of democracy, as set forth in the Convention.”206 
This demonstrates the global cultural confrontation between modern and 
Islamic legal traditions, which goes beyond the confrontation between 
western modernity and tradition. Traditions must not only be compatible 
with the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Convention, but they, more 
generally, must be compatible with “underlying values” and 
“fundamental principles of democracy.”207 These two notions have 
ample potential legal implications.208 Invoking a tradition is not 
sufficient to justify it; the justification is tied to the margin of 
appreciation. Thus, in the Dogru case, the Court expressly stated that 
Where questions concerning the relationship between State and 
religion[] are at stake . . . notably . . . when it comes to regulating the 
wearing of religious symbols in educational institutions, in respect of 
which the approaches taken in Europe are diverse. Rules in this sphere 
will consequently vary from one country to another according to 
national traditions and the requirements imposed by the need to protect 
the rights and freedoms of others and to maintain public order.209 
In fact, secularism may also be recognized by the Court as a national 
tradition, in particular as a pillar of Turkish democracy.210 It is true that 
the French and Turkish republics consider themselves as secular, under 
at least the constitutional aspect, while other countries are culturally, and 
even constitutionally, Catholic, Lutheran, or Orthodox. 
The position of the Court on this issue has not changed. Moreover, it 
has not been established that the display of a crucifix and the values it 
 
 204. Manoussakis v. Greece, App. 18748/91, 1996 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 47. 
 205. Refah Partisi v. Turkey, App. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98, 41344/98, 2003 Eur. Ct. 
H.R. § 123; Günduz v. Turkey, App. 35071/97, 2003 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 51; Güzel v. Turkey, 
App. 54479/00, 2006 Eur. Ct. H.R.; Kalifatstaat v. Germany, App. 13828/04, 2006 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
 206. Refah Partisi, 2003 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 123. 
 207. Id. §§ 86, 100. 
 208. The Court began to give them some substance, especially with the cases of Refah Partisi, 
Kalifatstaat, Leyla Şahin and Dahlab. They relate to an evolutional concept of civil liberties, sex 
equality, pluralism, tolerance and broad-mindedness.  
 209. Dogru v. France, App. 27058/05, 2008 Eur Ct. H.R. § 63; see also Kervanci v. France, 
App.31645/04, 2008 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
 210. Refah Partisi, 2003 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 52. 
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represents are contrary to the Convention, to its underlying principles, 
and to the fundamental principles of democracy. 
E. Majority Religion 
The Grand Chamber also ruled on the State’s ability to rely on the  
 
national majority religion to justify its interference with freedom of 
religion. 
The applicants presented themselves before the Court as a religious 
minority. Their position may be summarised as follows: considering the 
increasing religious pluralism in a country deeply marked by the Catholic 
culture, it becomes necessary to afford a special protection to minority 
groups against pressures by the dominant identity or culture. Moreover, 
such a special protection would contribute to the preservation of 
pluralism. Therefore, the applicants requested that the Court protect them 
against “the despotism of the majority.”211 Such despotism was allegedly 
manifested, for example, through the nearly unanimous vote of the 
school’s governing body to maintain the crucifix. 
The Court has always been keen on protecting minorities, 
considering that, in a democracy, majorities tend to misuse their 
dominant position. The democratic system, which entrusts power to the 
majority, must be corrected by supranational human rights protection 
mechanisms. These mechanisms ensure the protection of fundamental 
rights for each individual against the State and society as a whole. 
In its decision, the Second Section accepted this logic and blamed 
the Italian majority religion for being the majority religion. The Second 
Section stated that 
in countries where the great majority of the population owe allegiance 
to one particular religion[,] the manifestation of the observances and 
symbols of that religion, without restriction as to place and manner, 
may constitute pressure on students who do not practise that religion or 
those who adhere to another religion.212 
Following the reasoning of the Section, the presence of the crucifix 
would be more acceptable if the majority of the population were not 
Catholic. The Italian Government properly noted that this rationale is 
 
 211. According to the words of the applicant’s counsel before the Grand Chamber. Oral 
argument may be consulted in the file on the case at the Court’s Registry. 
 212. Lautsi v. Italy, App. 30814/06, 2009 Eur. Ct. H.R. §50 (2d Sec.), rev’d, App. 30814/06, 
2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. (G.C.). 
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absurd.213 
Thus, according to the Section, the inherent pressure of any majority 
religion on those minorities who live within its cultural environment is 
reprehensible. In order to respect minority groups, including atheism, the 
majority religion should be made into the functional equivalent of a 
minority. What appears implicitly in this reasoning is not only an illusory 
quest for religious equality, but also results in a concept of confessional 
neutrality that depends on pluralism. Pluralism and religious neutrality 
strengthen each other. 
When denouncing the oppressive effect of the majority religion, how 
is it possible not to also target oppression of any other social culture? 
Beyond this, what of the oppression exercised by society? This apparent 
paradox reveals the logic of conflict between the individual and society, 
specific to the political liberalism underlying the theory of freedom of 
religion. This conception of freedom of religion is based on a conflicting 
vision of the relations between the individual and society. Society and 
the individual are not considered in a natural relation of interdependence 
and complementarity, but in opposition: society becomes the main 
obstacle to individual liberty. Recognition of the absolute character of 
individual dignity and autonomy leads to de-legitimating the interests of 
the society. 
The fact that a society may have a religious identity transcending that 
of its members is allegedly no more acceptable. Such a conception of 
society allegedly exercises an illegitimate influence on State action, 
because it is based on presuppositions which are incompatible with the 
contemporary pluralistic ideology. The neutralist and pluralist concept of 
society opposes the essentialist concept. In this context, the distinction 
between the conduct and the nature of the State may be understood. 
According to the neutralist concept, society is purely artificial and 
instrumental, and at the service of the individual. An artificial instrument 
can have no being and even less conscience and it may only act 
instrumentally, aiming at satisfying individual rights. In focusing on 
Italy’s nature rather than its conduct, the Section placed itself in a 
position to blame Italy for being what it is, and to require it to act as if it 
were not so. Through this shift of focus from the conduct to the nature of 
society, freedom of religion becomes an efficient operational concept, a 
tool to secularize society. 
 
 213. See Lautsi, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R §§ 37, 39 (discussing how it was acceptable for Italy to 
permit Islamic headscarves because it was a minority religion, but that symbols of a majority 
religion were wrongly perceived as “aggravating”). 
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This concept of freedom of religion, which secularizes society 
through a shift in focus from conduct to nature, does not merely ignore 
but essentially reduces the religious dimension of social life and the 
social dimension of religion as much as possible. Both of these 
dimensions are natural and manifested through the majority. 
The “social dimension of religion” is difficult to legally comprehend 
because religious freedom first protects an inherent right of the 
individual against society. This freedom is universal because it is based 
on human nature, and it is imperative because it expresses an aspect of 
human dignity. This positive right to freedom of religion stems from the 
freedom of the individual act of faith. Therefore, according to the 
modern concept of freedom of religion, only individuals (alone or 
collectively) possess religious rights exercised within the limits imposed 
by national legislation. Only each believer individually holds a right, 
which is exercised mainly against other people and society. In brief, as 
only individuals have a conscience, only individuals deserve protection 
for the exercise of their conscience against any form of society because 
the cultural structure of society itself constitutes a potential constraint. 
The “religious dimension of culture” is also difficult to comprehend 
in the modern concept of religious freedom because the individual 
freedom of conscience is exercised in a given cultural area and often 
through differentiating from it, if not contesting it. Even more, 
considering that culture is oppressing in itself, some want fundamentally 
to negate or neutralize the religious dimension of societies and to empty 
the public arena of the free exercise of individual conscience. This 
neutralization should apply to all societies and intermediate bodies: 
nations, families, schools, etc. This modern concept of religious freedom 
presupposes the religious neutrality of the societies in which it is 
exercised. However, in many areas it is recognized in international law 
that nations may be entitled to subjective rights, such as the right to 
development or self-determination. Similarly, nations are legitimately 
entitled to protect their ecological, linguistic, and cultural identity and 
pass it down to subsequent generations. It is not so for the religious 
dimension of their cultural identity, though it is one of the deepest 
elements of identity. 
The model of a neutral and pluralistic society also implies changing 
the philosophical basis of freedom of religion. Indeed, this approach 
leads to limiting freedom of religion through a change in paradigm: 
freedom of religion is no longer treated as a primary, fundamental right 
directly stemming from the ontological dignity of the human person. 
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Rather, it becomes a secondary right, conceded by the civil authorities, 
derived from the ideal of democratic pluralism and held within the 
neutrality requirements of the public arena. This is a conceptual reversal. 
From a subjective right originating in a morally neutral individual 
conscience and exercised against the collective identity, we shift to an 
individual right that stems from a morally neutralized collective identity. 
The manifestation of religious convictions is, thus, limited by the 
requirements of the public order, understood as a neutral collective 
identity. 
Moreover, while pluralism was initially meant to be an inclusive 
perspective according to which various religions are considered equally 
good, the perspective now seems to have been reversed to the detriment 
of religion, treating religions as basically evil. Therefore, considering the 
dangerousness of religions, pluralism becomes the justification of a 
greater secularism, aiming at preserving a threatened public arena. The 
outlines of the public arena expand farther and farther: religious 
expression becomes banned, not only from the civil service and State 
institutions, but also from the street and what is visible from the street. 
This gradual expansion of secularism to society as a whole is the 
opposite of the original intention of the Convention, which meant to 
protect individual rights from an invasion of society by the State. 
Finally, this expansion gradually reduces the freedom of religion to a 
mere freedom of creed. In other words, freedom of religion is reduced to 
the freedom to privately have or not have a belief, but not to manifest it 
in public and collectively. 
Confronted with the logic that identifies neutrality and secularism, 
and finally reduces religion to faith and freedom of religion to 
secularism, the Government presented the concept of neutrality to the 
Court as an inclusive concept, in opposition to secularism (which is 
exclusive by nature).214 The Government, as well as the ECLJ, tried to 
prove that the concept of freedom of religion had to evolve, such that the 
law better takes the religious dimension of culture into account.215 
Taking into account the religious dimension of culture should allow, 
under some conditions, for the recognition of the legitimate interests that 
a society may have in preserving its culture, language, national heritage, 
and socio-religious dimension. To that aim, we specifically argued that 
secularizing the European public arena would contradict the Council of 
 
 214. See Written submission of the Government to the Grand Chamber, § 18. 
 215. Id. 
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Europe project.216 We also invited the Court to consider the State’s wish 
to respect not only universal moral values, but also the culture, language, 
customs, and traditions–even religions–of society as legitimate when 
examining the proportionality of an interference with the freedom of 
religion of an individual.217 Contrary to the values of pluralism, 
tolerance, and broadmindedness, these values are specific and not 
universal. However, they are the constituents of nations, the ultimate 
basis of modern sovereignty and therefore, in theory, of democracy. 
Similarly, against the secularist logic of the Second Section, the 
Italian Government gradually adopted a differentialist approach while 
safeguarding the principles of neutrality, secularism and equality. Thus, 
it affirmed that “the principle of neutrality and secularism does not 
exclude distinctions between religious communities.”218 Granting “a 
special status to some traditional churches . . . is not in itself contrary to 
the principle of equality.”219 On the contrary, differences in legal status 
may be justified by de facto differences, especially historic and cultural 
differences: “equality in law must maintain de facto differences between 
churches,”220 and “wiping out the de facto differences would be 
incompatible with the principle of neutrality in religious matters.”221 
Thus, according to the Government’s wish, taking the national socio-
religious identity222 into account, even if it is relative and evolutional by 
nature, partially allows avoiding relativism and religious indifferentism, 
without questioning the secularism of the Italian State. 
Finally, the Grand Chamber upheld this interpretation tinged with 
realism, and took into account the specifically Italian religious dimension 
of social life. Admitting that Italian law “confer[s] on the country’s 
majority religion preponderant visibility in the school environment,”223 
the Court immediately referred to the Folgerø case in which it 
 
 216. See Written submission of the Government and of the ECLJ to the Grand Chamber. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Application of the Italian Government for referral of the case to the Grand Chamber, 
January 28, 2010, §8. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id § 14. According to the Government, this characteristic is “represented by different 
factors, such as the tight links between the State and the people on the one hand, [and] Catholicism 
on the other hand, from an historical, traditional, cultural and territorial perspective, and by the fact 
that the values of the Catholic religion have always been deeply rooted in the feelings of the great 
majority of the population.” Id. 
 223. Lautsi v. Italy, App. 30814/06, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 71 (G.C.). 
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considered that “the place occupied by Christianity in the national history 
and tradition of the respondent State” justifies the fact that the syllabus 
granted a greater share to the knowledge of Christianity than other 
religions and philosophies, and this prevented considering the Christian 
preference as an indoctrination.224 Therefore, because Catholicism holds 
a predominant place in the Italian history and tradition, its Government 
may give it some preponderant visibility in the school environment. 
Thus, the Court recognized that in countries with a Christian 
tradition, Christianity possesses a specific social legitimacy which 
distinguishes it from other religious and philosophical beliefs. This 
reality justifies a differential approach. Because Italy is a country with a 
Christian tradition, the Christian symbol may legitimately have a 
preponderant visibility in society. 
The Court had already reached a similar solution in other cases. For 
example, it has ruled that, “taking into account the fact that Islam is the 
majority religion in Turkey, notwithstanding the secular character of the 
State,” for the State in Turkish schools to “grant a larger share [in the 
curriculum] to the knowledge of Islam than to that of other religions . . . 
could not in itself be considered a breach of the principles of equality and 
objectivity susceptible to constitute an indoctrination.”225 Similarly, in 
the famous case of Otto-Preminger Institute v. Austria, the Court did not 
disregard the fact that Catholicism is the religion of an overwhelming 
majority of Tyroleans.226 The European Court has long been attentive to 
relative and specific factors such as the national “moral climate,”227 
“tradition,”228 “cultural traditions,”229 the “historical and political factors 
peculiar to each State,”230 the “specificity of the religious issue”231 in a 
given country, or the “historical and cultural traditions of each society” 
in areas concerning the “deep convictions” of society.232 With this 
variety of religious, historical and cultural traditions, the Court noted that 
 
 224. Folgerø v. Norway, App. 15472/02, 2007 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 89. 
 225. Zengin v. Turkey, App. 46928/99, 2004 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 63 (unofficial translation). 
 226. App. 13470/87, 1994 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 56. 
 227. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, App. 7525/76, 1981 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 57. 
 228. Campbell and Cosans v. United Kingdom, App. 7511/76, 7743/76, 1983 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
 229. Casado Coca v. Spain, App. 15450/89, 1994 Eur Ct. H.R. § 54. 
 230. Gitonas v. Greece, App. 18747/91, 19376/92, 19379/92, 28208/95, 27755/95, 1997 Eur. 
Ct. H.R. § 39. 
 231. Murphy v. Ireland, App. 44179/98, 2003 Eur. Ct. H.R. (relating to a minister interdicted 
from publishing an advertisement with a religious aim on a local radio). 
 232. F. v. Switzerland, App. 11329/85, 1987 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 33; see also A. B. and C. v. 
Ireland, App. 25579/05, 2010 Eur. Ct. H.R. (relating to abortion). 
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there was no “uniform conception of the significance of religion in 
society.”233 
Therefore, taking into account the historical religious identity of 
countries is necessary to place the judgments of the Court in their context 
with regard to the social dimension of religion and the naturally religious 
dimension of society. This does not only benefit the majority religion,  
 
but it may also benefit secularism when this philosophical conviction 
constitutes the “religious” identity of society. 
F. Political and Religious Debate 
The Section’s judgment was often blamed for having turned religious 
freedom against religion and for claiming to defend religion while 
wiping it out of society234 Nonetheless, in some extent this reproof was 
not entirely justified, because it must be admitted that, in ruling in favor 
of the prohibition of the crucifix, the concept of religious freedom took 
up its original expression: opposition to State religion. In giving back to 
the concept of “freedom of religion” its original purpose, that is more to 
limit than to protect religions, the Court broke the compromise between 
Catholicism and modernity, which has been expressed mainly through 
the Declaration Dignitatis Humanae,235 which, in a way was an attempt 
to redefine freedom of religion in a manner both useful and devoid of 
conflict with the contemporary world. At the time of Christian-
democracy and Dignitatis Humanae, the civil right to freedom of religion 
enshrined in international instruments did not aim first at freeing the 
individual from the social sway of religion, but at fighting State atheism. 
In the Declaration, the Church finally accepted the concept of freedom of 
religion, provided it was based on the transcendent and ontological 
dignity of the person and oriented against the State, the atheistic State 
being the main target in practice. 
The modern theory of religious freedom, reformulated to the benefit 
of individual freedom against totalitarian ideologies, still remains 
capable of turning against religions because it only protects individuals. 
In fact, its nature makes it impossible to distinguish between religions 
and ideologies because no alleged truth can prevail over individual 
 
 233. Otto-Preminger-Institute v. Austria, App. 13470/87, 1991 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 50. 
 234. See Government submission to the Grand Chamber and its oral pleadings; Puppinck, 
supra note 79. 
 235. Pope Paul VI, Dignitatis Humanae, (Dec. 7, 1965). 
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freedom. Because it makes the freedom of one person prevail over the 
“truth” of the group, freedom of religion constitutes an efficient tool to 
secularize society. This made the Section take the same decision as that 
of atheistic regimes: the elimination of religious symbols. 
One can also wonder about the inescapable character of this shift in 
focus from the conduct to the nature of the State. Actually, some people 
may think that neutral conduct necessarily implies a neutral nature, or at 
least ends up leading to the neutrality of the nature. In this way, though 
the Convention does not require the confessional neutrality of the State, 
it eventually makes it inevitable. 
In this regard, we can note the way in which the Declaration 
Dignitatis Humanae tackles this problem. The object of Declaration 
Dignitatis Humanae is to recognize and affirm the civil right to religious 
freedom in regard to the conduct of the State. This right derives from the 
transcendent, ontological dignity of every person. Thus, the Declaration 
was broadly interpreted as implying that Catholic States renounce their 
confessional character. In fact, several Catholic states, such as Spain, 
modified their constitutions to that aim. However, the Declaration did not 
require it and considered the case of States where, “in view of peculiar 
circumstances obtaining among peoples, special civil recognition is 
given to one religious community in the constitutional order of 
society.”236 It is true that the Declaration considered this situation in 
order to demand “that the right of all citizens and religious communities 
to religious freedom should be recognized and made effective in 
practice.”237 The Declaration does not formally require a renunciation to 
the confessional character of the State, but only the limitation of its effect 
on the conduct of the State. 
The Declaration caused much debate. According to Archbishop 
Roland Minnerath, the theological evolution of the Catholic Church on 
religious freedom comes in particular from a change in its concept of the 
 
 236. Id. § 6. The full quotation is: 
If, in view of peculiar circumstances obtaining among peoples, special civil recognition is 
given to one religious community in the constitutional order of society, it is at the same 
time imperative that the right of all citizens and religious communities to religious 
freedom should be recognized and made effective in practice. 
Finally, government is to see to it that equality of citizens before the law, which is itself 
an element of the common good, is never violated, whether openly or covertly, for 
religious reasons. Nor is there to be discrimination among citizens.  
Id. 
 237. Id. 
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State.238 He analyzes the Declaration Dignitatis Humanae as confirming 
the relinquishing of the concept of the “society-State,” seen as a natural 
emanation of society, in favor of a functional and instrumental concept of 
the State.239 In other words, the Declaration manifests a rallying to the 
contractual, or at least voluntarist State, arbiter of liberties. In his view, 
this rallying modifies the ideological presupposition of the Church 
towards the State and has a necessary consequence: the recognition of 
the civil freedom of religion.240 Therefore, expressing a discourse on the 
primacy of the common good of the society and its ultimate aim (the 
eternal salvation) is particularly difficult when the public discourse is 
more focused on the “human person” rather than on society, and when 
religious freedom is presented as exclusively founded in individual 
dignity and conscience 
More fundamentally, the wiping out of the concept of the State as a 
natural emanation of society is caused by a de-legitimization of society 
in front of the human person, which comes along with the disappearance 
of the very possibility of identifying the substantial common good of the 
society. The disappearance of this possibility of substantial common 
good, in turn, explains that, in correlation with the vanishing of the 
society-State in favor of the functional-State, liberal-democracy has 
replaced Christian-democracy as the predominant political system of 
reference in Europe. 
In this context, it is understandable, as already noted, that the Lautsi 
case gave rise to a confrontation between liberal-democracy and 
Christian-democracy in the determination of the underlying values of the 
Council of Europe and the Convention. Two concepts of the State were 
opposed, one natural and one instrumental. 
Presently, regarding Church-State relations and religious freedom, 
the discourse of the Church seems to free itself from the ideological 
context of the period surrounding Council Vatican II. The official 
declarations of Benedict XVI during the Lautsi case reveal a certain 
reorientation. This was already perceptible in the exhortation Ecclesia in 
Europa241 in 2003. In a way, the Lautsi case gave an opportunity for 
 
 238. Roland Minnerath, Le droit de l'Eglise à la liberté, du syllabus à Vatican II, Coll. Le 
point théologique, Beauchesne, Paris, 1997. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Pope John Paul II, Post-Synodal Apostolic Exhortation Ecclesia In Europa (June 28, 
2003). In this text, Pope John Paul II declared that “In her relations with public authorities the 
Church is not calling for a return to the confessional state. She likewise deplores every type of 
ideological secularism or hostile separation between civil institutions and religious confessions.” Id. 
PUPPINCK.MRO2 2/8/2013 2:41 PM 
873 The Case of Lautsi v. Italy: A Synthesis 
 921 
Catholics, Orthodox, and some Protestants, including Evangelicals, to 
clarify their understanding of religious freedom 
Among the declarations of Benedict XVI during Lautsi, he recalled 
on August 15, 2005 that “[i]n public life, it is important that God be 
present, for example, through the cross on public buildings.”242 On June 
5, 2010, just a few weeks before the hearing before the Grand Chamber, 
the Holy Father recalled that “[t]he Cross is not just a private symbol of 
devotion . . . it has nothing to do with the imposition of a creed or a 
philosophy by force.”243 On June 12, 2010, at the time of the meeting of 
the ambassadors to the Council of Europe Development Bank, the Holy 
Father was even more specific: 
Christianity has enabled Europe to understand what the freedom, 
responsibility and ethics that imbue its laws and social structures 
actually are. To marginalize Christianity also by the exclusion of the 
symbols that express it would lead to cutting our continent off from the 
fundamental source that ceaselessly nourishes it and contributes to its 
true identity. Effectively, Christianity is the source of “spiritual and 
moral values that are the common patrimony of the European peoples”, 
values to which the Member States of the Council of Europe have 
shown their undying attachment in the Preamble to the Statutes of the 
Council of Europe. This attachment . . . establishes and guarantees the 
vitality of the principles on which European political and social life are 
founded and, in particular, the activity of the Council of Europe.244 
He clearly refers to the underlying values of the Convention, liberal 
or Christian. 
However, the most in-depth declaration of Benedict XVI on religious 
freedom is his message for the World Day of Peace 2011.245 The Pope 
explained that, due to the link between religious and moral freedom, 
“[r]eligious freedom should be understood, then, not merely as immunity 
 
§ 117. He went on, insisting on “healthy cooperation between the ecclesial community and political 
society.” Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 242. Pope Benedict XVI, Homily of His Holiness Benedict XVI at Castel Gandolfo (Aug. 15, 
2005). This took place after the judgment of the Veneto administrative Court in favor of the crucifix 
of Mar. 17, 2005. 
 243. Pope Benedict XVI, Homily of His Holiness Benedict XVI at Nicosia (June 5, 2010). 
 244. Pope Benedict XVI, Address to the participants of the 45th Joint Meeting of the Council 
of Europe Development Bank (June 12, 2010). This meeting, which gathers the ambassadors of the 
Member States to the Council of Europe, was held in the Vatican, as the Holy-See is a member of 
the Council of Europe Development Bank. 
 245. Pope Benedict XVI, Religious Freedom, the Path to Peace, Message for the World Day 
of Peace (Jan. 1, 2011). 
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from coercion, but even more fundamentally as an ability to order one’s 
own choices in accordance with truth.”246 In the same way, he said that 
“[a] freedom which is hostile or indifferent to God becomes self-negating 
and does not guarantee full respect for others.”247 The reminder that 
freedom is subordinate to truth is fundamental, and it constitutes a 
noticeable clarification of the present view on this point. Similarly, the 
message insists on “the public dimension of religion,” and in particular, 
it warns that “to eclipse the public role of religion is to create a society 
which is unjust.”248 
Finally, in his 2011 address to the diplomatic corps, also dedicated to 
the issue of religious freedom, Pope Benedict XVI expressed worry: 
Another manifestation of the marginalisation of religion, especially 
Christianity, consists in the ban on religious symbols and feasts from 
public life, in the name of respect for those who belong to other 
religions or do not believe. In so acting, not only is the right of 
believers to the public expression of their faith limited, but also the 
cultural roots which feed the deep identity and the social cohesion of 
many nations are cut.249 
In these few recent declarations linked to the Lautsi case, it clearly 
appears that, for the Catholic Church, religious freedom does not imply 
the confessional neutrality of the State and society. This is not new, in 
the Encyclical Mater et Magistra of 15 May 1961, Pope John XXIII 
denounced the modern era: ”[t]he most perniciously typical aspect of the 
modern era consists in the absurd attempt to reconstruct a solid and 
fruitful temporal order divorced from God, who is, in fact, the only 
foundation on which it can endure.” 
The present disintegration of societies, witnessed especially in 
Western countries, as well as the globalization that intensifies the crisis 
of collective identities, could put a brake on the individualist liberalism 
that supports the modern concept of religious freedom. From this 
perspective, the plea of the Italian government in favor of the crucifix as 
a fundamental symbol of the civilization reveals all its value. Italy, while 
resolutely desiring to respect individual liberties, refused to renounce to 
one of its main traditional symbol in the name of the postmodern cultural 
relativism and nihilism. Italian Ambassador Sergio Busetto expressed it 
 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Pope Benedict XVI, New Year Address to the Diplomatic Corps (Jan. 10, 2011). 
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as follows: “[r]especting the religious identity of an individual must be 
possible while respecting the religious identity of the society in which he 
lives.”250 
The declarations of Orthodox countries in favor of Italy may be 
understood along the same lines. These countries are particularly 
attached to the religious dimension of their culture and reluctant to 
embrace western post-modernity. Several Orthodox Churches (Churches 
of Ukraine, Serbia, and Bulgaria) even formally intervened through a 
letter to the Court. Others publicly took a stand. For example, in a letter 
to the Italian Prime Minister, Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and all Russia 
declared that “European democracy should not encourage 
Christanophobia like atheistic regimes did in the past.”251 He added that 
“[t]he Christian heritage in Italy and other countries in Europe should not 
become a matter to be considered by European human rights 
institutions . . . [t]he pretext of ensuring the secular nature of a state 
should not be used to assert an anti-religious ideology, which apparently 
violates peace in the community, discriminating against the religious 
majority in Europe which is Christian.”252 
Even more directly, the representative of the Russian Orthodox 
Church declared to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe (OSCE), referring to the Lautsi case, “I consider the concept of 
the religious neutrality of a state to be the most disputable issue in the 
OSCE area. Attempts to establish a model religiously-neutral state in 
Europe have many negative implications.”253 
The reaction to the Lautsi judgment freed many political and 
religious authorities to speak out against what has often been perceived 
as an unacceptable ideological abuse of the Court. The judgments of the 
Court are not directly enforceable. Thus, the authority of the Court is 
based on the assent of the States and, perhaps even more, on its prestige. 
 
 250. Sergio Busetto, Ambassador of Italy, Opening speech of the symposium organised by the 
ECLJ, the CNR and the Italian Embassy, at the Council of Europe (Apr. 30 2010) (non-official 




 251. Letter from Patriarch Krill, Russian Orthodox Church, to the Italian Prime Minister (Nov. 
26, 2009) available at http://www.mospat.ru/en/2009/11/26/news9194. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Vakhtang Kipshidze, Address during the Supplementary Human Dimension Meeting on 
Freedom of Religion or Belief of the OSCE, Vienna (Dec. 9–10, 2010) available at 
http://www.mospat.ru/en/2010/12/13/news32334/.  
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Because of the intergovernmental nature of the Court, the execution of 
judgments comes under the competence of the national authorities, under 
the supervision of the other governments. States execute the judgments 
with, more or less, docility and goodwill according to the circumstances. 
In the Lautsi case, it was obvious that the present Italian government 
would have refused to submit to a decision to withdraw crucifixes. Even 
more serious for the authority of the Court, this refusal would have been 
supported by numerous governments. Finally, it seems that for the Court, 
the present cultural diversity and identity crisis in Europe make it 
impossible to maintain both a unanimously appreciated prestige and 
“progressive” judicial activism. 
VI. CONCLUSION: THE CONSEQUENCES OF LAUTSI 
The consequences of the Lautsi case go beyond the issue of 
secularism. This case concerned the underlying values of the 
Convention. 
This study aimed to give a synthesis of the key lessons learned from 
Lautsi, from institutional, legal, philosophical, political, and religious 
viewpoints. Upon the publication of the first judgment of the European 
Court of Human Rights on November 3rd, 2009, Lautsi became a subject 
of debate and a social issue across Europe. In its first judgment, the 
Court condemned Italy for violating the negative freedom of religion, by 
allowing crucifixes to be displayed in public school classrooms. Going 
beyond the literal and original meaning of the Convention, the Court then 
stated that this combination of secularism and democracy should be the 
norm. European society, which was widely shocked by this decision, has 
since questioned the role of the Court, the relationship between human 
rights and our culture, the meaning of negative liberty, neutrality and 
secularism, and Christianity’s place within European identity. This 
reflection is an on-going process. 
Politically, the decision of 2009 ushered the Court into a new era, 
detaching the Court from the culture of the Christian-Democrat 
modernity which had inspired its creation. In fact, this judgment was 
often perceived as an abuse of the Court, and as marking the triumph of 
individual atheism over social religiousness. In other words, this 
judgment has been considered as marking a double abuse of power: that 
of an International Court on the national political society, and that of the 
individual on the national culture. Ultimately, society in its political and 
cultural dimension was delegitimized, like being caught between the 
individual and international levels which are emerging as the only and 
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ultimate sources of political legitimacy. The conclusive judgment finally 
delivered by the Grand Chamber of the European Court, 18 March 2011, 
corrects the judgment of 2009 and provides answers to questions which it 
had provoked. While the judgment of 2009 left a gap between the 
supranational authority and individual rights, the judgment of 2011 
restores to both national society and culture their quality and legitimacy 
of intermediate common good. 
 
The Lautsi case took place when modern ideologies were at a dead 
end. Europe questions itself more and more about its vision for 
civilization. The question Lautsi posed was if Christianity still has a 
place in modern civilization, or if it should be erased from this future 
Western identity. The Court finally reaffirmed the specific social 
legitimacy of Christianity in Europe, justifying the regulations conferring 
on the country’s majority religion preponderant visibility in the public 
environment in view of the place occupied by Christianity in the history 
and tradition. The Court has simultaneously relativized secularism whilst 
denying it any form of neutrality: it is not a compulsory model that 
Europe must adhere to in the future. Also, the Grand Chamber ruling 
clarified the meaning of the concept of neutrality, showing that, first, it 
apply to the acting of the State and not to its being, and second, that it is 
an inclusive concept rather than an exclusive one. 
From a more general point of view, there are many noticeable 
religious, geopolitical, legal, and institutional consequences of this case. 
This case has strongly contributed to the ongoing reform of the European 
Court. The intervention of some twenty countries against the judgment of 
2009 has allowed the Court to learn how to doubt itself, something which 
is good and necessary when so much power is involved. 
Since then, the Court gave the impression to distance itself from this 
postmodern liberal ideology. This much is evident in a series of cases 
relating to abortion, bioethics, and homosexuality. The Court seems to 
have begun to manifest a certain judicial reserve in morally sensitive 
issues. While the Court had become one of the favorite playgrounds of 
ideological activism, especially with regard to bioethics and sexuality, it 
seems to be re-discovering that the moral and ethical values underlying 
societies are worthy of respect.254 This was the case, for example, in 
 
 254. According to Metropolitan Hilarion of Volokolamsk, Chairman of the Department for the 
External Church Relations, “the Court itself has turned into an instrument of promoting an ultra-
liberal ideology.” Letter to the Vatican State Secretary (Nov. 27, 2009). 
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Schalk and Kopf v. Germany.255 In that case, the Court ruled there was 
no right for same-sex couples to marry.256 Additionally, in the significant 
judgment of A. B. and C. v. Ireland,257 the Grand Chamber expressly 
stated that there is no right to abortion under the Convention.258 Further, 
in the case of Hass v. Switzerland, the Court ruled there was no right to 
assisted suicide.259 The Court increasingly acknowledges the moral 
sensitivity of the issues and the State’s margin of appreciation in this 
regard. Similarly, in the case of Wasmuth v. Germany, which concerned 
the Church financing mechanism, the Court showed prudence against 
those who considered this case a new opportunity to reduce the influence 
of Christian churches.260 This trend has been confirmed with the ruling 
of the Grand Chamber in S. H. v. Austria.261 In this case concerning the 
ban of techniques of artificial procreation with sperm or ova donations, 
the Grand Chamber again reversed a Section ruling, affirming that the 
reference to “natural procreation” and to the “natural family” (with only 
one mother and one father) as the model for the regulation of the 
techniques of artificial procreation, justifies the ban.262 It also confirms 
that the sensitive moral questions raised by in vitro fertilization (IVF) 
can legitimately be taken into consideration by national legislators. Italy, 
Germany, as well as the ECLJ also intervened in this case before the 
Grand Chamber. 
The Lautsi case also had important consequences on national debates 
concerning the presence of religious symbols in schools, hospitals, or 
parliaments. These debates have existed for years, especially in Austria, 
Switzerland, Spain,263 Quebec,264 and Romania. The constitutional 
 
 255. Schalk v. Germany, App. 30141/04, 2010 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
 256. Id. 
 257. A. B. and C. v. Ireland, App. 25579/05, 2010 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
 258. This case held that the restrictions to abortion “were based on profound moral values 
concerning the nature of life” and concluded “that the impugned restriction therefore pursued the 
legitimate aim of the protection of morals of which the protection in Ireland of the right to life of the 
unborn was one aspect.” Id. § 226–27. 
 259. Haas v. Switzerland, App. 31322/07, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
 260. Wasmuth v. Germany, App. 12884/03, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
 261. App. 57813/00, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
 262. Id. 
 263. The Government of Mr Zapatero has announced that its new law on religious freedom 
would ban the crucifix from public schools. The Government eventually renounced to affront such a 
new conflict and to pass this law. 
 264. The Quebec National Assembly has also adopted a motion on  May 22, 2008, citing that 
“The National Assembly reiterates its desire to promote the language, history, culture and values of 
the Quebec nation, promotes the integration of all our nation in a spirit of openness and reciprocity 
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courts of Austria265 and even Peru266 have ruled that the presence of 
crucifixes in classrooms and courts was constitutional. These judgments 
were pronounced at the same time as the Lautsi judgment. In 
Switzerland, on June 22, 2011, the Supreme Administrative Court 
rejected an application aimed at banning the display of the crucifix in the 
corridors of a Ticino school.267 Moreover, the Swiss Parliaments are 
presently examining a draft initiative that expressly aims at “authorising 
the symbols of the Christian West” in the public arena.268 Since then, 
other applications have been presented to the Court, one about the 
presence of icons in Romanian classrooms,269 and another about 
crucifixes in Italian courts.270 
More fundamentally, the crucifix case has produced a deep unifying 
effect between the various European peoples. The support manifested by 
twenty-one countries bears witness that Christianity remains at the heart 
of European unity. This case was also an opportunity to bring the 
Catholic and Orthodox Churches nearer to each other and showed that 
their collaboration helps them influence the orientation of European 
policy. In the long term, this could be the largest consequence of Lautsi. 
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